Nationalism And Beyond: Humanitarian Assistance To North Korea (DPRK) And The Case Of The Korean Sharing Movement

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Abstract: This paper examines the dynamics of humanitarian assistance to North Korea in South Korea by situating it within the broader contexts of the transformation of South Korean civil society and the “national unification movement (minjok tongil undong).” Rather than analyzing NGO working conditions within North Korea or inter-Korean relations perse, this paper is more about the rise and growth of humanitarian assistance by South Korean civilian groups and the problems they faced. The case of the Korean Sharing Movement is analyzed more closely, mainly because it is the largest organization in the field. With the North Korean nuclear crisis developing into a serious phase (2002- ), the validity and effectiveness of humanitarian aid is increasingly questioned. The paper argues for the necessity of carving out a separate dimension of humanitarian assistance, which is sensitive to the local contexts of aid recipients, and is more oriented to a long-term “sustainable development.” A new vision of “unification movement” that goes beyond the simple logic of sentimental nationalism is necessary in South Korea, in order to build a more effective network of transnational civil society for the humanitarian cause and also to avoid the escalation of current nuclear crisis into a recklessly dangerous situation.

Key words: Nationalism, North Korea (DPRK), Humanitarian Assistance, UN, “Sustainable” Development, Korean NGOs, Transnational Civil Society, International Aid

I. Introduction: Nationalism and Humanitarian Assistance

This paper examines the dynamics of humanitarian assistance to North Korea in South Korea by situating it within the broader contexts of the transformation of South Korean civil society and the “national unification movement (minjok tongil undong).” Rather than analyzing NGO working condition within North Korea or inter-Korean relation itself, this paper is more about the rise and growth of humanitarian assistance by South Korean civilian groups and the problems they faced. The case of the Korean Sharing Movement is analyzed more closely, mainly because it is the largest organization in the field. With the North Korean nuclear crisis developing into a serious phase (2002-present), the validity and effectiveness of humanitarian aid is increasingly questioned. The paper argues for the necessity of carving out a separate dimension of humanitarian assistance, which is sensitive to the local contexts of aid recipients, and is more oriented to a long-term “sustainable development.” A new vision of “unification movement” that goes beyond the simple logic of nationalism is necessary in South Korea, in order to build a more effective network of transnational civil society for the humanitarian cause and also to avoid the escalation of current nuclear crisis into a recklessly dangerous situation.

As Benedict Anderson (1983) has argued, nationalism creates an imagined community. In the Korean case, strong states and strong ideas of nation do not overlap, so that this imagined community remains as an ambiguous site where the moral callings for an unfinished project of nation-building on the one hand, and

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a vigilant guard against the “primary enemy” on the other, collides. Unlike many other cases where international organizations provide humanitarian assistance to a place with a very weak, half-collapsed state cannot control the situation, North Korea poses a new challenge as well, since it is a country with a strong state however dismal the living conditions of its people might be (Flake & Snyder 2003). Nationalism provided, and still is, a very effective means to mobilize the energies of its constituents in both states, but the time for a sentimental nationalism might be due, at least in South Korea, particularly when it comes to the matter of humanitarian assistance. This paper argues that although nationalistic sympathy provoked the first major domestic responses from South Korean NGOs to answer the “un-requested” Brethren Love from the North, more careful and strategic crafting of new languages of talking about “helping North Korean people” is required, a new language that goes beyond nationalistic rhetoric and places North Korean case securely along with many other cases in the world where urgent international co-operation and care is required. Instead of sentimental nationalism, perhaps a better rhetoric might be a new kind of “sustainable” development model — sustainable in the sense that it can be continued riding the waves of turbulent political up-turns —, which is more sensitive to the local situation and more persuasive to the wider international community.

Since the mid 1990s, a persistent famine within North Korea began to draw worldwide attention. United Nations agencies and many international NGOs initiated sending food and relief in Aug. 1995, answering official aid requests from the DPRK government after a huge flood in July/August of the same year. However, since South Korea was not included in the emergency call, the “angered” South Korean government, despite the fact that it was no longer dictatorial and therefore did not have to rely heavily on ideological accusations of the Communist DPRK for
its own legitimacy, at first reacted negatively, making any immediate food assistance from the South Korean private sector almost impossible. Also, as launching of the “four party talk” (South and North Korea, U.S., and China) was a key foreign policy objective at that time, and the South Korean government did not want any non-governmental initiatives, however humanitarian it might be. The government not only worried that civilian groups might be manipulated if they freely contacted the North on an individual basis, but it also could not allow itself to be “bypassed” by the activities of its own citizens when “the exclusion of South Korean government” has always been the principle of the North Korean foreign policy.

It was at this time that many influential civilian leaders from religious and other social groups gathered together to call attention to the issue of emergency relief and began to rally for “helping the brethren.” Marking the 50th anniversary of the division of the country after World War II, Christian organizations in Korea had already named the year 1995 as “the Wishing Year for Unification,” and many Catholic and Buddhist organizations had also celebrated the 50th anniversary of the country’s independence from the colonial rule with a special religious wish for a “peaceful unification.” Upon hearing the news about North Korea through the United Nations, therefore, there arose a systemic movement within these groups to pull resources to help alleviate the famine, which was joined by other civilians as well, because it was regarded as a matter of ‘national’ mission. In June 1996, a non-governmental organization called the Korean Sharing Movement2. was officially launched, encompassing 6 religious

2. Nambuk Nanum (the South-North Sharing Campaign) is different from KSM, but it, too, is very active, and has organized the Christian Association of Supporters for North Korean Brethren (Kidokkyo Bukhandongpohuwon Yonhapho)
sects and various professional associations, with 35 joint representatives from various fields. But the particular circumstances of the Korean Peninsula—the division of the country under the influence of the Cold War—did not allow a non-governmental organization to raise funds or to carry out any other activities since helping North Korean people was equated with “helping a hostile country.”

The problem was that the real threats of war has long been used by pre-mid 1980s authoritarian regimes in South Korea to oppress any kind of opposition to the government, so that it became almost impossible to distinguish a humanitarian dimension from the security concern of the state. On the other hand, with dominance in economic power since the 1980s, South Korean popular perceptions of North Koreans gradually changed, from ‘dreadful, threatening Communists’ to ‘needy, hunger-stricken brethren.’ But faced with dire circumstances in North Korea, there simply did not exist any way for South Koreans to help them, nor any guarantee that those relief materials would indeed reach those in need. Out of nationalistic ebullience and humanitarian concern, fund-raising was done mostly in the form of “religious donation” first within different religious sects and later surrounding the Pan-Religious Committee for Helping the North Korean Flood Victims (KSM 1999, Lee Jong-moo 2000). Leaders of the Korean Sharing Movement as well as of other smaller size civilian organizations all used the government-designated channel of the Korean National Red Cross to send rice and corn powder, the distribution of which was monitored in the North by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.4.

3. 6 biggest religious sects in Korea such as Christian, Buddhist, Won Buddhist, Confucian, Cheondokyo, and Catholic were the participants. Catholic, Christian, and Buddhist organizations had their own centers.
4. See Schneider (2003) for problems regarding the workings conditions of
In fact, before the flood, the South Korean government had started sending 150,000 ton of rice to the North since June 1995, based on the Beijing Rice Conference held directly with North Korea in April of the same year. It was both a humanitarian assistance and a political gesture of generosity. But because of a series of events—such as the detention of a South Korean ship in August 1995 and the infiltration of North Korean submarine into the South in September 1996—, the South Korean government, until March 1997, did not approve of fundraising among the “unspecified civilians” to help North Koreans, nor did it allow media or private corporations to join it. (Kang 1998) During the period, not only the international public opinion criticized the South Korean government for being “cold-hearted,” but many non-governmental organizations in Korea also echoed this view in their efforts to draw out government support (Seo 1999).

One inadvertent result of this was that the contribution of South Koreans had not been publicized well enough, internationally and—perhaps more importantly—to the North Koreans. The WFP internal statistics did not include the direct aid by the South Korean government made in 1995 because it did not go through the WFP. On the other hand, almost all private sector aid to the North was channeled, via the Korean National Red Cross, to the United Nations (WFP) and the International Federation of Red Cross without revealing the donor’s identity. World Vision Korea was a rare case in that it used its overseas center office (World Vision International) to relay its aid to the North directly.

international NGOs in North Korea.
II. Background and Development of “Unification” Movement

The growth of the humanitarian assistance to the North, however, cannot be discussed without delving into the history of the politicized social movements within South Korea. The Korean Sharing Movement, too, can only be understood in the light of the existent ideological cleavages between the Left and the Right or the Progressives and the Conservatives, and how they have been re-arranged, shuffled, and gradually transformed by regime change as well as by shifts in international environment.

Throughout the development era of the 1970s and the 1980s, various sectors of the society resisted the military government in South Korea in an organized form, and the existence of North Korea has provided both a substantial reason and a subterfuge for repressing and regulating civilian associations of all sorts. Under a situation where the government monopolized all official discourses on unification, for example, it was not even allowed to talk freely about unification or ways of achieving it even in imaginary terms. Social groups were inevitably classified according to their tacit “position” toward North Korea or ideas about the division of the Korean Peninsula. The dividing line was whether they regard it as totally beyond the business of civilian groups for security’s sake, or as something that justified—if not directly caused—the military dictatorship and therefore had to be acted upon carefully in order to bring about any domestic change—“democratization”—in South Korea. In other words, it was not just

5. The dichotomy of Left and Right, however, does not overlap exactly with that of the progressives vs. the conservatives. Whereas the former dichotomy mainly refers to ideological leanings on Socialism, the latter more or less is based on people’s attitude toward social reform in general.
that any anti-establishment activities tended to be labeled as “Communists.” Since the blueprints of all social groups implicitly reflected how they count—or do not count—North Korea strategically in their grand scheme of social reform, subtle difference in attitudes regarding this matter became a cause of schism even among the various anti-establishment groups, let alone among the “Left” and the “Right”. The only thing that was shared in common was “national unification” as the ultimate symbol which none—Right, Left, Conservatives or Progressives—disputed officially, but unification remained as an abstract moralistic force rather than any kind of a concrete action plan.

One such division, which manifested itself most coherently in the increasingly radicalized student movements of the 1980s but which also existed in labor movements, was that between so-called People's Democracy (minjungminju) line and National Liberation (mijokhaebang) line. Both held Marxist ideology and nationalism at its heart and belonged to the anti-establishment camp. But whereas PD emphasized “domestic revolution through class struggle,” NL was putting more emphasis on “national liberation/unification,” was more critical about U.S role in the Korean Peninsula, and was more sympathetic toward North Korea in achieving what was called people’s democracy. NL became dominant within student movement and led the Korean League of University Students Associations (Hanchongryon).

With the fall of eastern European Communist Bloc and the widening gap between the arguments of student activists and the perceptions of ordinary citizens, however, the social influence of NL gradually weakened in the late 1980s, although all moderate unification movements of the 1990s were somewhat influenced by the NL line of thought. Many activists tried to make sense of the changed environment, some moderating their objectives, some simply changing their tactics, and some leaving the movement for good. New, rather temperate civilian groups were formed such as
Citizen’s Coalition for Economic Justice (Kyongsilryon or CCEJ, 1989) and People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (Chamyeoyondere or PSPD, 1995), which dealt with more pragmatic, immediate concerns of the capitalistic society, inviting a wider participation of ordinary citizens. There was some—but not all—continuity between the core members of these organizations and the previous NL-PD related social groups, but they successfully set new agendas befitting the changed atmosphere, and mobilized many hitherto non-activist citizens from various walks of life who were nevertheless sympathetic toward the idea of gradual social reform toward a better society. These new kinds of social groups began to be considered as leading the rise of civil society in Korea, and their activities as civilian movement (Shimin Undong) began to distinguish itself from the more radical, minjung-oriented social movements (Minjung Undong or Kicheung Undong) of the previous decades. One of the important characteristics of these representative civilian organizations was that they focused on “domestic issues”, which they regarded as more urgent, leaving the unification-related issues to others.

In the area of unification-related activities, as the divisiveness within social movements deepened with the Presidential

6. There were other movements of a smaller size such as the Co-op Movement (Saelwhal Hyupdong Chohap Undong), which, growing out of PD line labor movement of the 1980s, also spoke to the issue of corporate governance. The new civilian groups, which had their roots in the 1980s movements, all agreed that capitalism as a system is an irreversible trend, and that corporations, rather than capitalism itself, should be the focal points of action to bring about social reform within the society. Later, CCEJ (Kyongsilryon) faced a crisis when its morality was questioned with a series of events such as a wiretap scandal.

7. There were other representative organizations such as women’s groups and environmental groups but the North Korea did not loom large in their scope of activities.
election of 1987, and as the fall of the Eastern European Communist Bloc began to shatter the structures of the Cold War, the Pan Korean United (*Bumminryon*) was organized in 1990 to network various social groups with different backgrounds and areas of activities. Within the Pan Korean United, there arose debates surrounding the issue of networking South, North, and overseas Koreans. Some radical members insisted the symbolic importance of having direct contacts with North Koreans, whereas more moderate members thought the idea was “too much inclined toward the Left” that might prevent any other social activities, which could potentially benefit unification in the long run, from taking place. For the latter, broadening the basis of unification movement was most urgent, whereas direct contact to North Koreans would only invite suppression from outside.

And it did. In 1993 after a series of government interventions and internal disputes, some well-known core members—some of them with Christian background—departed from the Pan Korean United and organized another umbrella organization called the National Meetings for Autonomy, Peace, and Unification (1994, *Chajupyungwhatongil Minzokhoeui* or *Minzokhoeui*, here-tofore OneKorea). Thereafter, the OneKorea and the NADRK (the

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8. In June 1987, social movements reached a peak asking for “democratization” as the military regime under President Chun approached an end of its official term. With the “June uprising,” the government suggested direct Presidential election as an option to the public. It was accepted, but the activist camp could not unify between Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung, leading to a defeat. As the aftermath of the election, social movement camps became all the more divisive.

9. The Korean Christian (*kidokkyo*) Presbyterian Association was more active in unification movements, among whom are well-known priests such as Moon Ick-Whan, Park Soon-Kyung and Hong Keun-Su, whereas the Korean Jesus (*yesukyo*) Presbyterian Association has been more conservative.
National Alliance for Democracy and Re-unification of Korea, *Cheonkuk Yeonhap*10, functioned as two pillars of unification movement within the activist camp with as a kind of loosely organized umbrella network, which encompassed almost all social activist groups in the unification field. Around 1995-96, however, the OneKorea also underwent a severe investigation and repression because it, too, contacted North Korea (the Chosun Asia-Pacific Peace Committee) bypassing the South Korean government “in order to let the North Korean government understand the changes in South Korean society and prevent North Korea from initiating reckless things” so that “social movements in the South and North Korea could truly bring about synergetic effects.” (Interview, Jan. 2000) In other words, the more moderates within the activist camp were concerned that North Korea would regard the Pan Korean United, which was more radicalized by then compared to its initial stage, as its “appropriate partner.”

The endless fission and fusion within the social movement in South Korea jolted the unification field once again with the advent of the Kim Dae-Jung government. Not only that the President’s Sunshine Policy toward North Korea changed the governmental stance drastically, but there also arose a new division within the unification movement. Those who opposed Kim

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10. NADR(K1991) was formed by networking the predecessors of the Korea Confederation of Trade Union (*Minnochong*) and the Korean League of University Students Association (*Hanchongryon*), as well as the Korean Farmers League (*Junnong*). The Pan Korean United, when it was first organized in 1990, was more comprehensive in terms of the ideological spectrum than NADR(K. Since NADR(K was much reduced in size by the time OneKorea was organized, it was more like the NADR(K belonged to OneKorea. After OneKorea was divided over the issue of making the NCRK (*Minwhahyup*) and NADR(K, too, was all the more reduced when many departed for NCRK, those remained within NADR(K began to identify themselves with by then, the more radicalized Pan Korean United.
Dae-Jung’s foreign policy from a more radicalized stance\textsuperscript{11} succeeded from all existing organizations in the unification field and created the Council for the Autonomous Unification (Minjokwhahae Jajutongilhyupuihoe or Chatonghyup), whereas those who regarded it was essential to maintain “critical yet cooperative stance toward the government” proposed to the new government the creation of a National Council for the Reconciliation of the Koreans (Minzok Whahaehyupryok Bumkukmin Hyupuihoe or Minwhahyup, heretofore NCRK), composed of a whole spectrum of social groups in the unification filed as well as representatives from the political parties. The NCRK was modeled after the Tripartite Council for Labor, Management and Bureaucracy, which had been created right after the launch of the Kim Dae-Jung government to resolve labor issues, but when NCRK was established, political parties, instead of bureaucracy (the Ministry of Unification), participated in the Council.

Since NCRK (Minwhahyup) was an umbrella organization made later in 1998 aiming at the South-South dialogue, i.e. the formulation of a domestic consensus on unification issues through extensive dialogue between the Right and the Left or the conservatives and the progressives within South Korea,\textsuperscript{12} it was the National Society for Helping the North Korean Brethren (Kyoraesarang Buknyukdongpodopki Bumkukminundongbonbu or Kyoraesarang, heretofore NSHNKB 1996), an organization specifically formed by the initiative of the OneKorea, which led the humanitarian assistance to North Korea within the activist camps.

Notably, when the news of extreme famine in North Korea

\textsuperscript{11} It is the case of more radical, rather pro-North activists, and many from the NADRK joined it. They are totally different from the more conservative opponents / doubters of Kim’s Sunshine policy.

\textsuperscript{12} Another objective of NCRK was to build a joint council between civilian organizations and political parties of the South and North Korea (the South-North dialogue).
first reached the South, most activist groups did not believe that such a thing could happen in “the Democratic People’s Republic”, and regarded the news as crafted (Interview, Jan. 2001). It was the more moderate civilian NGOs and conservative religious groups which first put forth the seriousness of the matter and initiated handing out food, clothing and medicine to North Korea, some of whom began gathering information on their own by interviewing the North Korean defectors/refugees in China. When it was confirmed that indeed there has been deaths by hunger in North Korea, however, NSHNKB (Kyoraesarang) was organized, linking labor, peasants, and other activist organizations. It was extremely vigorous in the beginning, but after the first wave of nationwide fundraising worthy of about 3 billion Won (a little more than 2 million dollars) was made, the organization became ineffective. It was partially because the initial zeal to help “brethren” cooled down and each activist groups went back to their own business especially with the onset of the Asian Financial Crisis (1997), and partially because the OneKorea (Minjokhoeui), which actually organized and led NSHNKB, were divided in the process of making NCRK (Minwhahyup) in 1998 with the launching of the Kim Dae-Jung government.

If the NSHNKB was the representative organization of the activists camp, the Korean Sharing Movement was an organization which tried to link groups of various ideological shades, ranging from the most conservative “anti-Communists” who, for example, had migrated to the South during the Korean War, to the rather moderate progressives who had participated in the

13. Good Friends, formerly called as the Buddhist Branch of the Korean Sharing Movement, is well known for helping the North Korean refugees/defectors and for conducting surveys (1997. 9.30-11.30).

14. It was the rather moderate core member of the NADRK who departed from both NADRK and One Korea this time. Those who remained led NADRK.
progressive / radical social movement of the 1970s-80s. “Because of the structures of the Cold War which still permeates the Korean Peninsula,” one of the staff at the KSM explained, “it was absolutely essential to entice the conservative forces within the society such as religious groups or the Association of People from the 5 Northern Prefectures (Ibuk5dominhoe), just to be able to start helping North Koreans. Simply put, the KSM was conservative on the surface but progressive in contents. The Korean League of University Students Associations (Hanchongryon) and a few others did criticize us for ‘denigrating and distorting North Korea’, whereas others suspected we’re ‘Communists.’” (Interview, May 2000)

Markedly, although “moderate activists / progressives” exist in NSHNKB,15 in KSM and in many other civilian organizations, a chasm seems to exist between KSM on the one hand and the activist camps in general on the other, in spite of the “good will” on both sides. It is because some of the KSM members who once worked at the Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice had severely criticized the activist camps of the 1970s-80s as a whole,16.

15. Currently, an organization called KADECO (National Coalition of NGOs for Inter-Korea Agricultural Development & Cooperation, Nambuk Nong-balhyop, 1999) inherited some of the human resources and the ethos of NSHNKB, although it focuses more on sending seed potatoes to North Korea. KADECO includes such conservative groups as YMCA, YWCA, Korea Women’s Association United, and the Korean Association of Christian Churches. They sent about 500,000 dollars’ worth of aid in 2000 (Ministry of Unification 2001, Jan. 9).

16. Many in the civilian sector believe that the Ro Tae-Woo government (1988.2-1993.2) strategically promoted CCEJ (Kyungsilryon) as a way to provide an “alternative form of civilian movement,” different from the anti-governmental ones of the previous times. Although the “transformations / conversions” of activist camp members were inevitable, especially considering the social change with the end of the Cold War, some activists, radical or moderate, felt bitter about CCEJ’s open criticisms of the
and “received spotlights from media thereby as ‘converted star activists.’” The former regards the latter as “someone who made a career out of ‘selling their friends’ instead of simply pursuing new ways of undertaking social reform in a changed environment”, whereas the latter regards the former as “someone who don’t understand social/global change and still hold on to the sentiments of the Old Left.”

One corollary of this is that the KSM, as the largest civilian organization in the unification field, tries to present itself as an eager upholder of “national/ethnic movement” (minjok undong, Seo 1999, Lee 2000) and tends to stand out of other civilian movements (shimin undong) in general by distinguishing “unification movement (tongil undong)” and “civilian movement.” Importantly, this view is also shared by other moderate progressives in the civilian movements who think “there are other more important and fundamental issues within South Korea than previous social movements and its their participants in general. This division is also reflected in the severe criticism made by one of the well-known figures of the KSM regarding the general civilian movement, the National Coalition for Rebuilding Korea (Je2ui Keonkuk), and the Citizens’ Coalition for the General Election (Chongsun Yondae) at a workshop where many representative NGOs participated and debated about the future of civilian activities (the Munwha Daily, Nov. 24, 2000). It does not mean, however, that the activities of the KSM are discredited because of that.

17. Other complaints came from smaller organizations, which once worked together with the KSM for specific events/projects, concerning the fact that their own contributions were overshadowed and taken away by the KSM. When asked, one staff at the KSM replied, “because of the size of the organization, media tended to omit the names of smaller organizations, which resulted in this kind of criticism.” (Interview, May, 2000)

18. World Vision Korea, a religion-based organization, is the largest in number, but in terms of the total aid, the KSM topped the list in the year 2000 with its 10.8 billion won (about 9 million dollars) worthy of aid.
the issue of humanitarian aid to the North.” Indeed, just as North Korea itself does not come easily into the view of many South Koreans in their imaginings of “our society”, one of the striking characteristics of the KSM is that in spite of the huge number of enrollments and remarkable records of achievement, the activities of KSM tend to be defined as “distinct from” other civilian activities.

“We (KSM) do not consider ourselves as part of the civilian movement (shimin undong). What we are doing is the unification movement. There’s a clear distinction. The former deals with the mid-term to short-term main issues of our society, whereas we deal with mid-term to long-term side issues of the Korean society. Unification is clearly a side issue.” (Jan. 2001)

“I was thinking about devoting myself to the Humanitarian Assistance to North Korea, but I decided not to, at least for now, because being part of the humanitarian program with this particular group (which solicited the interviewee to join) meant that I have to cut off all my current ties to the civilian movement and immerse myself to the most conservative Christian sect (Interview, Jan. 2001).”

This distinction between “unification movement” and “civilian movement” was further pronounced with the onset of the Asian Financial Crisis. It was because those in the NGO sector, activists or not, didn’t have much experience in humanitarian projects of any kind until quite recently, and when they did start helping the undernourished children, the adoptee, and the unemployed, especially with the onset of the Asian Financial Crisis (1997), they did so at the expense of, rather than in addition to, the humanitarian aid to the DPRK, because all resources were
re-located to help alleviate domestic emergency. Indeed, labor, democratization, and unification have been dominant themes of social movement in South Korea since the 1970s, but until the early 1990s, it was the state that monopolized public discourses on “unification.” Not only that ordinary citizen could not talk freely about ways of “unification”, but for many activists, “unification” was also a vague final objective that could only be achieved by the democratization of the South Korean society. With the emergence of non-military South Korean government in 1993, the meanings of “unification movement” within activist camps changed as “to help draw a blueprint for unification through communication and exchange between South and North Korea.”¹⁹ In more concrete terms, it meant 1) softening of the ideological reifications of South and North Korea; 2) cultural and student exchanges to dissolve perceptions of North Koreans as “enemies” and 3) ultimately, efforts to nullify the National Security Law in the near future.²⁰ There was not much room for humanitarian projects within the South Korean NGOs in general, nor was there any infrastructure, even as an OECD country, for them to use ODA for humanitarian purposes in the international setting. As a result, “unification movement” in its traditional sense of the term and the “humanitarian aid to North Korea” did not gear well into each other, and there was not systematic planning or evaluation of activities among different NGOs, as to how the humanitarian aid to the DPRK should be positioned in the long-term development of the Korean civil society itself.

¹⁹. Many activists regard Moon Ick-Whan’s visit to North Korea in 1989 as a significant turning point in the beginning of the reconciliation with North Korea.
²⁰. This last one is still very controversial. As for the first two, CCEJ has a Unification Council (Kyungsilyon Tongilhyuphoe) and the Green Korea United (Noksaek Yonhap) has a plan to conduct a South-North Joint Environment Survey.
“Many civilian groups had to carry out aid projects without any experience in the field. It was like they were dumped onto the stage without any preparation. At first, even the resourceful groups such as religious sects did not know where to go and what to do. As for the activist camps, helping North Koreans in hunger could be a persuasive cause, but it was harder for them to link the humanitarian act of helping North Korean refugees/defectors (*talbukja*) to the ‘unification movement’ of the past as they had defined it long time ago. People asked themselves, somewhat confused, ‘in what sense could it be of any help for our movement?’ (Interview, Jan. 2001)”

The dynamics of NGOs, government, and transnational society in this field also demands careful examination, considering that aid to North Korea cannot help but be affected by government policies, which again are influenced by international factors. After the initial appeal to the nationalistic sentiments of “helping the brethren” was over, fundraising within the civilian sector faced serious predicament twice. First, when the Asian Financial Crisis hit the country at the end of 1997 and all the available resources were relocated to help the unemployed in the domestic setting. Second, when the Summit Talk of South and North Korea (June 2000), in spite of nationwide jubilations, dramatically chilled civilian fundraising to help North Korea. Put differently, because much of the fundraising activities as well as other humanitarian assistance to the DPRK had to depend on emotional appeal and emergency call\(^\text{21}\) without institutional backup, the relationship between the government and NGOs became com-

\(^{21}\) For example, the KSM organized events such as international fasting day, or cross-country walks as occasions for thinking about hunger in North Korea and raising money for humanitarian aid.
petitive rather than complementary, and humanitarian aid to North Korea was perceived to be a zero sum game with regard to the general welfare of the South Korean society.\textsuperscript{22} Also notable is that in spite of the tremendous importance of international factors in this matter, there were very few instances of Korean NGOs networking with transnational civil society and thereby mobilizing international resources on their initiative.

Relative absence of international lobbying has other factors. Noticeably, most civilian groups in Korea, including KSM, initially thought they did not need assistance from the international society. This was partly due to the activist legacies of the 1970s-80s when most social movements were anti-governmental as well as “anti-American.”\textsuperscript{23} They regarded aid to North Korea was more a “national issue” than the universalistic, worldwide humanitarian relief activities. As proponents of “national movement”, they did not feel the need to publicize their activities or to mobilize other international foundations/organizations. KSM has been networking the Korean-American society since 1997 and established a worldwide network of overseas Koreans in the U.S, Canada, Australia, Southeast Asia, Russia, China, and Europe in 1998. However, it was by relying on the already existing religious branches within the overseas Korean community,\textsuperscript{24} rather than

\textsuperscript{22} According to a public opinion survey conducted by the Ministry of Unification in 2000, 55% of the sample population supported the food assistance to the DPRK by the government, whereas 45% opposed to it. (The Hankyorea Daily, 2000, Oct. 4)

\textsuperscript{23} Although they are no longer particularly “anti-American,” many were critical of Western countries’policies toward the underdeveloped world.

\textsuperscript{24} The absence of Japan is noticeable. It was because KSM was extremely cautious about keeping a “neutral position” with regard to the Left/Right rifts, and the sharp division within the Korean community in Japan, between those who are closer to South Korea and those to the DPRK, made it difficult. In 1999, Korea-Japan NGO forum for the Humanitarian
by creating a new transnational force as in the examples of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) or the Human Rights Watch (Florini 2000).

“Long before South Korea became an OECD country, international NGOs and organizations could have come to Korea for help, but they didn’t, except for UNDP and UNESCO, simply because they could not find appropriate partners in Korea. It was not an accommodating atmosphere.” (Interview, Jan. 2001)

“In 1996, the Rockefeller Foundation tried to form a consortium to help the DPRK, but it failed, because most NGOs in Korea did not think that it was necessary. Some thought the Foundation was too conservative, but many others also thought that American NGOs had better lobby their own government to lift the U.S. economic sanctions on North Korea than try to give a hand to the humanitarian aid projects.” (Interview, Jan. 2001)

“UN says we better go through UN because it has its own offices in North Korea, visits 160 places out of the 211 Counties in the DPRK, and is able to monitor aid activities. But because it is our problem, we (KSM) Assistance to the DPRK was held in Tokyo, where KSM, Okedongmu, and the Japan Volunteer Center participated.

25. FALU is a liaison office within the World Food Program DPRK, Pyongyang, to support non-resident NGOs (Action by Churches Together <Geneva>, Adventist Relief Agency <Silver Springs, MD>, CARITAS International <Rome>, Canadian Food Grains Bank <Winnipeg>, Mercy Corps International <Portland, OR>, World Vision International <Monrovia, CA>) with programming, monitoring, and reporting. One staff at the World Vision Korea explained that FALU gives World Vision International the privilege of having an access to the DPRK just as any other NGOs helping the North would do through FALU, making it possible to get over the
would like to do it ourselves.” (Interview, Jan. 2001)

Other than the problem of donor monitoring of humanitarian activities in North Korea and keeping it transparent, therefore, the relative lack of institutionalization and clear division of labor between government and NGOs in the humanitarian assistance field is the most urgent problem so far, which also accounts for why the relationship between the two has been adversarial at first and competitive later, instead of being cooperative and complementary all along. A dramatic example is the Summit Talk of June 2000, around when all civilian transactions with the DPRK came to a halt for 4 months. Since 1999 February, the Kim Dae-Jung government had allowed civilian organizations to contact North Korea independently after they gain permission from the South Korean Ministry of Unification (multiple channel policy), but the independent channels thus developed by civilian organizations were rather unstable even for the largest donor NGO such as the KSM. Staffs from the Chosun Asia-Pacific Peace Committee, the DPRK counterpart, used to stay in Beijing only temporarily and went back to North Korea, or they selectively meet only those with larger amount of aid. In a way, the strong concern of many NGOs that Sunshine Policy might overshadow civilian transactions with North Korea proved legitimate. Not only that larger sums of money were negotiated and given over to North Korea through the government channel, belittling voluntary activities of any kind, but the Unification of Ministry also strengthen its grip on civilian organizations by permitting and evaluating their visits to North Korea or distributing subsidies among them. This kind of instability forced civilian organizations to feel even more threatened by the involvement of international organizations in the field.

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limitations of an American NGO.
“This time, the Korean government should have sent the 100,000 ton (out of the total 600,000 ton) of food to the DPRK not through the World Food Program of the United Nations but through the channel of domestic civilian organizations. And the way the government money is distributed should also have been different, that is, not for free but as a matching fund for a certain kind of civilian activities, such as agricultural cooperation, forestation, or public health projects. (Seo Kyung-suk, Oct. 9, 2000, The Moonwha Daily)

Instead of ad hoc, relief-based assistance based on nationalistic sentiments alone, therefore, building-up of institutional infrastructure, clear-cut division of labor between the government and civilian sector, and systematic mobilization of transnational civil society is required, which, in the long run, can help stabilize the humanitarian aid project itself apart from the ever-changing political environment surrounding the Korean Peninsula.

III. Achievements and Current Activities of the KSM

In spite of a chasm between the humanitarian assistance field and other civilian movements, still, the most significant contribution of KSM is that it first called attention to the issue; created a wide network of religious sects, ordinary citizens, and activists and continued its activities against all odds. Not only the Kim Young Sam government did not support the cause at first,

26. There are 16 full-time staffs at the KSM now. Many labor movement experts who had joined KSM initially also left.
27. Since May 1997, through the Korean National Red Cross, civilian organizations were allowed to entrust designated deposition with North Korean institutions using their own names, but when the fundraising spread
the Kim Dae Jung government, notwithstanding its engagement policy, at first also reduced governmental contribution to the aid project almost to a half, in order to prioritize the issue of war-separated families (KSM 1999:79). Since North Korea has been the “primary enemy” for more than fifty years, “North Korea as a regime” and “North Koreans as people in need” has never been distinguished in South Korea, and any move to help North Koreans inevitably stirred up a whole array of diverse issues related to North Korea, making it all the more complicated. Positioning against both pro-Socialist and anti-Communist movements, therefore, KSM and other civilian organizations interested in humanitarian issues rallied under the belief that “No Exchanges Possible without Any Aid” (Lee Yong-Sun. 2000 June). They succeeded in enlisting support from many ordinary citizens in 1997, and for the first time, sent food, used winter clothing, shoes, books, and vinyl to North Korea (KSM 1999).

Table 1. Aid to North Korea, Yearly Total (unit = $10,000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government</strong></td>
<td>23,200</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>2,667</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>2,825</td>
<td>7,863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civilian</strong></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>2,056</td>
<td>2,085</td>
<td>1,863</td>
<td>3,513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>23,225</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>4,723</td>
<td>3,185</td>
<td>4,688</td>
<td>11,376</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

throughout the nation enthusiastically in 1997, KSM and NSHNKB were charged and investigated by the government for violating the Regulation Law for the Collection of Donations which stipulates that only 2% of the money could be used for administration fees of a civilian organization. (KSM 1999, Lee 2000) See also an article by Dong, Yong-Seung (Hankyorae Daily, Oct., 4, 2000) for the international public opinion at that time which regarded the South Korean government as “cold-blooded” with no concern for humanitarian aid at all.
<Sources of Table 1 & 2, Ministry of Unification, 2001, Jan. 9 “Trends in Aid to the DPRK, Dec. 2000 & Annual Report 2000” http://unikorea.go.kr/kr/load/c34/c3454.htm NGOs without independent channel used Korean Red Cross, and is not included here>

**Table 2. Domestic Civilian Organizations’ Aid to the DPRK (1$ = approx. 1,260 Won)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names of Civilian Organizations (Independent Channel to the DPRK)</th>
<th>Amount in year 2000 (Unit=1,000 Won)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Korean Sharing Movement</td>
<td>10,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Okedongmu</em> (Children Shoulder to Shoulder)</td>
<td>6,904,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-North Sharing Campaign</td>
<td>5,983,030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eugene Bell Centennial Foundation</td>
<td>4,897,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Vision Korea</td>
<td>2,112,230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good Neighbors Korea</td>
<td>1,708,430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea Welfare Foundation</td>
<td>1,193,430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic Committee for the Reconciliation of Korean People</td>
<td>1,926,580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean JTS (Join Together Society)</td>
<td>1,040,380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Aid for Children of the D.P.R.K</td>
<td>176,230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea Buddhist Order Association</td>
<td>368,950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One Korea Buddhist Movement</td>
<td>71,060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Corn Foundation (joint projects)</td>
<td>4,428,930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>41,610,780</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The establishment of Kim Dae Jung government in February
1998 loosened governmental regulations on humanitarian activities. The creation of independent channel to the DPRK (Feb. 1999) was allowed, and participation of media and private corporations in the fundraising activities was permitted (March 1998). Also, civilians were allowed to visit North Korea for monitoring of aid activities and management of co-operation projects for the first time (Sept. 1998). But fundraising at the civilian level had become extremely stringent with the onset of the economic crisis since the end of 1997. KSM began to experiment alternative ways. Instead of focusing on raising “more” donations, the issue was now “how to use the limited amount of fund most effectively.” The method of helping a particular region in a more focused way by sending small amount of food through the ethnic networks of Korean-Chinese was newly developed, as in the project of sending milk-goats to North Korea to be raised and redistributed among farmers (The KSM Newsletter, Dec. 1998).

One of the other new methods KSM actively pursued was to participate in the inter-Korean “economic co-operation” which began along with the Kim Dae Jung government’s new principle of separating business from politics in dealing with the DPRK. In 1998, for example, KSM tried to incorporate a private company, to send sericultural equipment, vinyl as well as idle facilities and heavy equipment from bankrupt South Korean companies to North Korea. (KSM Newsletter 1998. 8.1) The idea was that due to the differences in labor costs and stages of industrial develop-

28. This method of using Koreans in China is being most effectively used by Good Friends / JTS Korea. (Interview Jan. 2001) The JTS America has also actively promoted the project of helping kindergartens in the Najin-Sonbong area by sending nutritional powder through the system of designated deposition.

29. Since the economic crisis, many factories shut down and production stopped in numerous places because firms could not import raw materials due to the sharp increase in exchange rates.
ment, sending idle equipment and importing semi-completed materials back could not only help solve economic problems in South Korea but could also help enrich the North Korean people. The company did not materialize, because it was regarded as “inappropriate” for a civilian organization to be directly involved in attracting investors for a business, but it provided KSM a know how for mobilizing various sectors of the society. Making use of this experience, KSM later sent over-produced items in South Korea to North Korea, such as eggs (the Stock-Raisers Association), tangerines (the Cheju Prefecture Local Government), sea weeds (the Wan Island), and potatoes (the Kangwon Prefecture Local Government), in a way that could benefit both South (price stabilization) and North Korea (humanitarian aid).

Indeed, a new trend of co-operation and consultation between South Korean NGOs and private business sector regarding various projects related to North Korea emerged. In the case of KSM, the Keumgang Mountain International Group,30. which had helped KSM since its inception, created an IT firm called HANABIZ31. 

30. The Korean-American CEO of this Group, Park Kyung-Lyoon, initially had been on the same boat with the Unification Church when the latter first tried to develop the Keumgang Mountain Tour project with the North Korean government. After this project was handed over to the Hyundai Group, the Unification Church moved on to the “Pyung Wha Car Center” project, and the Keumgang Mt. International Group turned to KSM for other “economic co-operation” projects, providing a crucial impetus for the creation of HANABIZ. (Interview, Feb. 2001)

31. The literal meaning of HANABIZ is “business which makes the South and the North one entity.” The CEO of the Keumgang Mt. International Group is an honorary president of this firm, and Park's brother is also involved. The South Korean participants own 60% of the firm as opposed to the North Korean portion of 40%. It is a possibility that HANABIZ contributes a portion of its shares to KSM later, as it already did so for the Citizens' Action Network (hamkke haneun shimin haengdong, a civilian organization established in 1999), where Moon Kwang-Seung, the
together with several other South Korean venture firms in April 2000, and a former KSM project manager joined it as the president (The Cheonja Daily, Feb. 24, 2001). HANABIZ created the first South-North IT joint venture called HANA Program Center in 2001, together with the Pyungyang Information Center.32.

It could be said that in a situation where the government is increasingly taking an aggressive role, creating a small firm out of a civilian organization and contributing a certain portion of its shares back to the civilian organization might be just one innovative way of carrying out an aid project to North Korea. But this effort to “incorporate a firm which directly supports NGO activities (Moon, K. Sept. 25, 2000, The Joongang Daily)” did not succeed, because the costs of technical training for the North Korean personnel were too high for a business firm to bear (Interview with a KSM staff, 2006).

What this meant was that the role of the South Korean government, which “supports” NGO activities regarding the humanitarian aid to North Korea, grew bigger than ever before. In fact, the South Korean government twice modified the law for the “Inter-Korean Co-operation Fund (Nambukhyupryok Kikeum, 1990, Aug.),” which was originally for governmental projects such as KEDO, in order to support small and medium-sized firms participating in the inter-Korea economic co-operation (1998) and then again, also to help civilian organizations’ humanitarian activities in the DPRK. (1999, Oct.) The drop in international assistance since 2001 and further worsening of the international public opin-

32. In the past, the Chosun Asia-Pacific Peace Committee was solely in charge of all contacts with South Korea, but with the sheer increase of contacts after the Summit meeting of 2000, many private-level contacts, especially with regard to economic cooperation, were delegated to the North Korean “National Economic Co-operation Federation (Minjok Kyungjehyuprok Yonhaphoe or Minkyungyon).”
ion when North Korea’s nuclear plan was known to the world in 2002 made the South Korean government’s role even more pronounced. Moreover, as the UN Human Rights Commission stated, in its proposed resolution on the DPRK, that the issues of human rights, North Korean refugees, and six-party talks aimed at resolving the nuclear issue should be areas of concern for all humanitarian organizations and NGOs that seek to help North Korea, heated debates on the effectiveness of humanitarian aid to North Korea arose in South Korea once again, along the cleavages of “pro-government” and “anti-government” forces framed as “progressives” and “conservatives” respectively. Characteristically, while conservative religious groups that were also involved in humanitarian assistance to the DPRK did not find contradiction in pursuing human rights cause as well, KSM found it a bit

In a changed environment, many NGOs in the field formed a new united front toward the government, They issued a statement in Oct. 2000, arguing for the participation of civilian representatives in the governmental Council for the Promotion of Inter-Korean Exchanges and Cooperation (Nambuk Kyoryuhyupryok Chujin hyupuihoe)\(^{33}\). the introduction of matching fund system for managing Inter-Korean Co-operation Fund\(^{34}\) to help boost private fund-raising activities in the field; the introduction of no-interest loans for NGOs in agricultural development activities; and the introduction of Block Grant whereby governmental budget can be delegated to qualified civilian organizations for a certain area of activities. They also required that at least one fourth of the governmental aid to North Korea, which is channeled through World

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33. Chaired by the vice minister of the Ministry of Unification, bureau chiefs from the relevant ministries of the government participated in the Council.
34. Some were against this idea because they thought matching fund system only favors already established, large organizations at the expense of smaller, specialized ones.
Food Program, to be re-oriented to civilian organizations to be directly delivered to North Korea. These suggestions show how much the civilian groups felt frustrated and overwhelmed by the onset of Sunshine Policy, and how they came to rely more on the governmental subsidies after the initial “nationalistic zeal” among South Koreans subsided (Table 1).

Among the long list of NGO requests, the request for the creation of a joint policy discussion group was materialized in 2004 when the Council for the Civilian-Government Joint Policy Discussion for the Aid to North Korea (Daebuk Jiwon Mingwan Jungchaek Hyupuihoi) came into existence. Considering that the economic difficulties in North Korea is structural and chronic which cannot be solved by short-term, relief-based aid program, and also considering the fact that fund-raising at the NGO level for this cause is getting increasingly difficult, there is a growing consensus between the South Korean government and NGOs that short-term, relief-based aid programs should be converted to a long-term, “sustainable development” policy options which can be implemented at various levels of the society simultaneously.

What is characteristic about the KSM is that in addition to the Humanitarian assistance to North Korea, it has also been helping overseas ethnic Koreans in general under an explicitly ethno-nationalistic banner. Particularly those in China and Russia, and the Korean-Chinese migrant workers within South Korea have been other major areas of KSM activities. However, since the South Korean humanitarian assistance to North Korea needs to be changed from “relief-oriented events” to a more “development-oriented system”, the urgent task for KSM is to reframe the explicitly ethno-nationalistic cause into a more universalistic language of “sustainable development” and institutionalize the procedures of helping North Koreans in a way that is more persuasive internationally and stable domestically. Nationalistic passion can energize NGOs for a short period, but languages of
nationalism doesn’t make up for the lack of institutional infrastructure, neither does it provide a convincing rhetoric for the transnational civil society to mobilize resources for humanitarian activities in North Korea. Instead of the ideals of “helping the national brethren,” what could be more effective internationally is to re-orient the North Korean issue strategically on a par with any other cases of international humanitarian assistance. One Korean civilian worker who relatively has been exposed to the international NGO community put it this way;

“To many Westerners, the 1997-98 fever in Korea, collecting money and gold rings to help ‘North Korean brethren’ or to get over the Financial Crisis, was an incomprehensible phenomenon. Many were really surprised by the fact that Koreans mobilized resources under a sentimental nationalistic cause alone, even when it was so clear that to do so in such a haphazard way could not be effective eventually.” (Interview, Jan. 2001)

Another challenge that faces South Korean NGOs like KSM is to invent a new development model different from the currently available ones at international organizations. As they are mostly based upon past experiences from other underdeveloped parts of the world where extreme disasters occurred in the absence of political control within the recipient country, manuals for the working conditions of NGOs do not apply in the case of North Korea where the real challenge is how to work with the strong political system that is still firmly in control of the society as a whole even in the presence of natural and economic disasters. In one experienced non-Korean civilian worker’s words,

“North Korea would probably be the model case for a new kind of development pattern in the 21st century. In
the 20th century, many humanitarian aid projects were conducted under ‘Caucasian’ leadership, with their material contributions, and mostly in Africa or India beleaguered by natural disasters. Since the ‘operating protocol’ in many international organizations is based on experiences in such places, there were many cases where the historical and cultural contexts of Korea were ignored. For example, instead of abstaining from making judgmental comments about the North Korean government in order to make the aid project successful, staffs from international organizations often took horrible pictures of North Korea and made the whole thing extremely sensational, for which they were then kicked out of the country.35 Only after that, more moderate staffs would be dispatched, but again there was very little concern for local circumstances or for the local operating system. There was not even one personnel who could speak or understand Korean language in the ‘monitoring’ staffs of international organizations dispatched to North Korea.36 How can you ‘monitor’, let alone ‘support’ the aid project when you have so little understanding of the country concerned?

In one case where a group of people tried to extend

35. Also refer to the unpublished paper by Kim, Mi-Kyung, “Fundraising Strategies of the Humanitarian Assistance Agencies”. She argued in the paper that the more horrible the picture is, the more likely for a humanitarian assistance agency to raise larger sum of money, and therefore taking these kinds of pictures and using them again and again is in fact an essential part of their “marketing strategy.”

36. This was a low priority within international organizations, but North Korea, too, out of concern that direct contact with outsiders might interfere with the regime’s tight control over its own people, required that these personnel don’t speak any Korean.
medical assistance, they failed because they tried to ‘replace’ the North Korean medical system instead of ‘supporting’ the people working within the system. What we need is a lot more than the so-called ‘international standard’ for aid projects. Rather than ‘food experts,’ who float around all over the world with the same operating protocol, we need more culture-sensitive personnel who understand the local contexts very well. At present, the aid projects are no longer the monopoly of the ‘White men.’ South Koreans are interested in participating in it and have done so. They need to do something on their own first and then try to reach out to the international world, rather than the other way around (Interview, Jan. 2001).

In fact, starting 1999, the Korean-American Sharing Movement, the U.S. offices of KSM, actively participated in the consortium of American NGOs\(^{37}\) to be part of the International Seed Potato Project for North Korea\(^{38}\) organized by the U.S. Aid. However, it was only after the 1999 Beijing Conference was over, organized by the Inter-Action (a group of American NGOs in the field), that concrete efforts to create transnational network began to materialize. Indeed, KSM and other Korean NGOs such as World Vision Korea, Good Neighbors Korea, and Korea Welfare Foundation have been involved in domestic community building,

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37. Participants were the Carter Center, The Adventist Relief and Development, Amigos International, CARE, Catholic Relief Service, Church World Service, and the Mercy Corps International.

38. It was a part of the long-term agricultural development project for North Korea. It signified the change in the U.S. government’s stance that it could be supportive of “bilateral assistance” to North Korea rather than the hitherto used method of indirectly supporting through the World Food Program. (KSM 1999) KADECO also carries out a seed potato project.
and together, they created the Korean NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea (bukminhyup) in 1999. It not only functioned to create a central focus in terms of negotiating with the South Korean government, but it also became the central body to reach out to the international NGO community in the humanitarian assistance field. After a series of meeting in Tokyo (2000), Yongin, Korea (2001), and again in Beijing (May 2005) where a wide range of people, including the UN personnel, who had been involved in the humanitarian assistance to North Korea gathered together, a network of information exchange among NGOs as well as international organizations were set in place. However, in September 2004, the international aid community in Pyongyang was informed that the DPRK government would not participate in the CAP (Consolidated Appeals Process) and that monitoring activities and international staff numbers should be decreased (communication with a European personnel, 2005). Faced with this new difficulty, even more worrisome was the comment of a Korean NGO staff;

“The aid from international community has decreased dramatically. Now we have to continue to emphasize the existence of our activities so that later, when development efforts take off, these international NGOs cannot claim their leadership role.” (Interview, March 2006)

IV. Conclusion: Nationalism and Beyond

The development of humanitarian assistance to North Korea has developed since 1995 answering the North Korean call to international aid. Interestingly, although North Korea has never relied on “nationalistic” rhetoric to extract aids from South Korea,
civilian voluntary activities were characterized by sympathies toward “national brethren” and the necessity/moral obligation of helping them for peaceful unification in the future. Inevitably set at the intersection of National Security Law and international security concerns, it was not easy, especially at the beginning of the humanitarian assistance activities, to break away from the real and perceived notions of North Korea as the “primary enemy,” and this distinguished the humanitarian assistance to DPRK from all other humanitarian aid activities organized by international organizations and NGOs.

Characteristically, the aid activities started mainly by religious and more conservative civilian groups rather than by the more radical activists in the classic “unification movement field” of the past decades. The latter not only did not believe the realities of North Korea at first, but also lacked financial means to sustain a long-term aid projects. Indeed, the “activist camps” in general underwent fission and fusion after the Presidential election of 1987 and various kinds of new civilian activities arose vigorously in a changed, post-Cold War environment, ranging from more radical, pro-North Korean ones to the more domestic reform-oriented ones with a serious concern for creating “better forms of capitalism.” Humanitarian assistance to the DPRK was but one variation of the classic “unification movement” led by former activists in the labor movement field (PD line) who succeeded in mobilizing many moderate activists, ordinary citizens, religious groups, and even conservative anti-Communists in spite of South Korean regime change in 1998 and 2002 respectively.

This paper analyzed the case of KSM simply because it was the largest civilian donor statistically. Putting KSM into perspective, especially in the contexts of the development of South Korean civil society, revealed the interesting chasm between the “civilian movements” in general and the “unification movement” as its minor genre. Also noticeable is that after the nuclear crisis
broke out, and accordingly, as new domestic and international concerns on the effectiveness of humanitarian aid to the DPRK arose along with the newly intensified concerns on human rights issues, “peace and reconciliation”—less politicized term—replaced the already laden, more politicized term of “unification movement” to refer to the humanitarian activities and development aid to the DPRK.

One of the significant lessons of the humanitarian assistance to the DPRK was that the limitations of relying purely on nationalist passion regarding North Korean issues became apparent. Once emotional waves subside, urgent issue was how to build long-term, institutional infrastructure that could bring about consistent improvement in living conditions in North Korea. The overshadowing of civilian activities by the government’s “Sunshine policy” testifies to the rather feeble basis of South Korean NGOs’ in this field. Selective behaviors of North Korean counterpart in choosing which organizations’ offer it would “choose to take,” aggravated the unnecessary “competition” among NGOs, marginalized budget-tight small-scale civilian activities even more, and enlarged the South Korean governmental role to a degree that inevitably entangled the humanitarian issues with political ones.

Indeed, fission and fusion did not just occur within the “activist camps.” Sudden and aggressive governmental initiative on the issue of reconciliation with North Korea, after so many years of governmental monopoly on unification discourses from a strong anti-Communist stance, also generated a backlash and produced legitimate confusion among many citizens in South Korea, which could have been avoided had the South Korean society been exposed to more open public debates on the “unification”—or, “inter-Korean”—issues for a longer period of time. When the humanitarian assistance to the DPRK as it was officially defined by the South Korean government no longer exclusively re-
ferred to aid-related activities but incorporated such diverse activities as supporting the re-union of separated families and the resettlement of North Korean defectors / refugees (saeteomin), South Korean NGO’s scope of activities in the “sustainable development of North Korea” were even more reduced if they had kept on relying on the government for their own survival. Too much reliance on a particular regime or a government may further endanger NGOs’ bases for activities as it would inevitably make them vulnerable to the changes in political climate. Regime change (2008) and the subsequent drastic cooling down of inter-Korea relationships is the case in point. Instead of asking more support from the government, crafting more effective means of mobilizing the international community for developmental aid that transcends naive nationalistic rhetoric, and maintaining the wisdom of navigating through the Scylla of insensitivity to security and human rights concerns and the Charybdis of blindly imitating the existent “development models” for the Third World countries might be necessary.

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