

Cold War Structure and Culture in South Korea

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Abstract South Korean culture during the Cold War times has been made not just by the Cold War structure at the global and regional level, but also by innate, ongoing structural development: in this case, modernizing process of South Korea. South Korean Cold War culture was the combination of these various cultures: political authoritarianism, developmental economy, militarism, and westernization. These elements have been organically combined by worldwide Cold War structure and culture, producing a very specific Cold War culture in South Korea. To trace the evolution of the Cold War culture on the Peninsula, this article, first, traces the relationship between structure and culture from the start of the Cold War until the period of Roh Moo Hyun's presidency which attempted the possible dismantlement of the Cold War architecture on the Peninsula. Second, it examines the interaction of various subcultures during the Cold War period. The mixture of many structures produces also various and multi-faceted cultural contents. These different cultural contests form subcultures and affected South Koreans in different issue areas. Third, it examines different features and aspects of Cold War culture of South Korea in different times.

Keywords South Korea · Cold War · culture · identity · international relations theory

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Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War at the global and regional level, the Korean Peninsula was still conceived as the last bulwark of the Cold War. The structure as well as the culture the Cold War still persisted. Two Koreas armed with a high level of military preparedness and cultural animosity have been structurally interposed, and competed to prove the superiority of their own systems and cultures. South Korea, often cited as the most successful case achieving the development of market economy and liberal democracy at the same time, did not hesitate to show most fundamental disrespect towards North Korea which is notorious for its totalitarian political system and communist economy with degenerating welfare.

This deep animosity, however, showed symptoms of modest improvement especially when the inter-summit meeting between two Koreas took place in the post-Cold War period, in 2000. The tide of nationalism toward reunification overcoming the Cold War rivalry swept the Peninsula. The political, socio-cultural, economic exchanges between two Koreas have remarkably increased beyond anyone's imagination. Intercourses and meetings between various groups in many fields have been regularized, and after experiencing the delay during the Kim Dae Jung period, the second summit meeting between President Roh Moo Hyun, and Kim Jong Il took place in October, 2007.

Yet the transformation has not been complete. North Korea has withdrawn the Non-Proliferation Treaty in March, 1993, and declared the development of nuclear program. Since then, the so-called "North Korean nuclear crisis" has continued, and the North reached at the point of declaring itself as the nuclear weapon state. With this strategic decision in the early 1990s, inter-Korean relations have continuously aggravated and now Kim Jong Un, the third leader negates any possibility of denuclearizing North Korea based on his so-called Byungjin Line, which means that North Korea will modernized its economy as a nuclear weapon state. Also the mutual distrust between the U.S. and North Korea never stopped to increase only to deepen the North's worry about its survivability. Culturally, severe rift began to be unfolded in South Koreans' perception of North Korea, not to speak of persisting North Koreans' antagonism against South Korea.

The gap between the global and regional post-Cold War transformation, and still resistant Cold War structure and culture on the Korean Peninsula can be explained by the political, military and socio-economic structural architecture, and cultural politics and identity politics between two Koreas. The interaction between structure and culture, as well as the interaction between global/regional change and peninsular situation, explains the essence of this gap. Each two sets of interaction sometimes reinforce the other, in other times challenging and resisting the other.

The deconstructing process of the Cold War culture methodologically shows the complexity of the Cold War structure and culture on the Peninsula. With the change of global balance of power from bipolarity to unipolarity or uni-multipolarity, and the subsequent, similar changes in the region of Northeast Asia, it is true that the structural constraint on the peninsula has weakened. This makes us rethink the peculiarity of the Cold War on the Korean Peninsula which is to be distinguished from the global or great powers' Cold War (Seonkonghoe University 2008).

The Cold War culture in South Korea may be distinguishable in contrast to other countries:

first, the country itself is divided and Cold War structural and ideological confrontation has been deepened; second, both Koreas experienced the “hot war”, that is, the Korean War, in which Koreans internalized the Cold War antagonism with traumatized experiences; third, geographical position of the Korean Peninsula made two Koreas the main forefront of Cold War rivalry in East Asia, heavily militarizing the territory on the basis of bilateral alliance between South Korea and the U.S., and that between North Korea and the former USSR and China; fourth, as two Koreas had not experienced civil society before the Cold War was consolidated, the norms and worldviews for Korean Cold War had been produced and mobilized from the above, that is from the state sector; fifth, as the main ideologies constituting the Cold War cultures, that is liberal democracy and communism, are foreign to two Koreas, and adaptations or distortions, were inevitable to some degree different to depart from traditional political and social philosophy (Berger 1996).

This article, first, traces the relationship between structure and culture from the start of the Cold War until the period of Roh Moo Hyun’s presidency which showed the possible dismantlement of the Cold War architecture on the Peninsula. South Korea during the Cold War can be characterized as the country under rapid and multi-layered structural transformations. Politically, Korea was liberated from Japanese colonialism in 1945, went through the process of separate processes of state-building in two Koreas. After division, South Korean politics experienced, continuous struggle between authoritarian regime and the democratic movement in South Korea. Structural changes in state-building and democratization heavily affected political and social culture of South Korea.

Economically, the capitalist development, or more interestingly, economic development according to the model of developmental state, characterizes South Korean economic structure during the Cold War period. Strong state intervention onto the market, and the so-called “Confucian way of capitalist development” affected the socio-economic mentality of South Koreans.

Socially, westernization or post-Confucian transformation changed the ideological or social identity of South Koreans. Under the overwhelming influence of the United States and western countries, South Korea modernized itself with the guide of liberal democracy, accepting newer identities such as liberalism, individualism and rationalism. All these political, economic, and social structural transformation was intermingled with the evolution of the Cold War structure. The Cold War characterized by global and regional bipolar power distribution, and ideological confrontation, colored South Korea’s own structural transformations and subsequent cultural features. Heavy militarism, ideological bipolarity demonizing communism, and divisive foreign perception stemming from two-camp structure gave rise to very specific mixture of South Korea’s structural transformations and the Cold War structure. As structure forms culture with its material power and culture, once formed, with its inertia, operating on structure, South Korea’s multi-layered structural change illuminates very specific cultural contents of the Cold War that it experienced.

Second, it examines the interaction of various subcultures during the Cold War period. The mixture produces also various and multi-faceted cultural contents. Different cultural contests form subcultures affected South Koreans in different issue areas. Politically we can observe the rise of strong nationalism, authoritarianism, and democracy. Nationalism, despite the Cold War ideology distancing the North not as part of rightful nation, worked as the basis of reunification movement at the deeper level. Authoritarianism, during the presidencies under Rhee Syng

Man, Park Chung Hee, Chun Doo Whan, justified centralized power structure which was perceived to be very effective to realize anti-communism, and economic development. As opposed to authoritarian justification of political regime, very strong sense of democratization began to develop especially since the end of Rhee era, materializing in the democratic revolution in 1960. The democratization movement, even under the Park's militaristic regime, persisted, characterizing political culture of South Korea under the Cold War era.

Economically, capitalist culture developed in the process of economic modernization. Market-oriented mentality pervaded into South Koreans' minds, encouraging individualism and profit-oriented mentality. The marketism, however, co-existed with developmentalism in which state still assumes the prior power. Socially, the post-Confucian transformation of South Korean society fits into economic modernization, resulting in the rise of individualist culture. However, this trend conflicted with remaining traditional culture and new collectivist mentality rising from authoritarianism. South Korean Cold War culture, then, is the mixture of these subcultures originating from analytically different structures.

Third, it examines different features and aspects of Cold War culture of South Korea in different periods. Several events demarcate Cold War culture. During the period of Japanese colonialism, nationalists and communists have maintained twofold relations of cooperation and competition, which led to ideological competition after liberation. By the 1948 when two Koreas finally established two separate governments officially making the division inevitable, ideological confrontation was backed up by international structure defined by bipolar configuration between the U.S. and the former Soviet Union. The Korean War, however, is no doubt the seminal experience for South Koreans to internalize the Cold War culture in the form of "hot" war. Actual killing of the other party for ideological reasons and for exclusive sovereignty deeply traumatized South Koreans. Two Koreas demonized the other, both structurally and culturally. Also the military alliances between South Korea and the U.S., also between North Korea and the former USSR and China concluded after the Korean War, made Peninsular Cold War structure more formidable. From the year 1960 when the April 19 revolution took place, the longing for democratization became stronger. South Korean citizens took issue with anti-communist culture unilaterally imposed by the government, refreshed the common identity between two Koreans under the tenet of nationalism, and stress the importance of inter-Korean exchanges and finding commonality for reunification. Without corresponding reactions from the North, the movement could not find the momentum and more seriously military coup d'état by Park Chung Hee changed the whole scene. Since then, official policy of the government worked as the constraining element for civil society's effort to loosen the Cold War stereotyped culture and revive one-nation identity with North Korea.

Theoretical perspective: Cold War Structure and Culturing the Cold War

To delve into the culture of Cold War in South Korea, the relationship between social structure and culture is to be analyzed. And the multi-layered social structures that evolved during the Cold War period in South Korea coexisted, interacted with the global and regional Cold War structure. The Cold War may be characterized bipolarity between two superpowers in military, political, economic, and ideational areas. The whole world was divided along the line of two

camps led by each superpower through the most formidable mechanism of military alliance. But as time goes by, the Cold War has been cultured. Many scholars illuminate the culture process of consolidating the Cold War structure in the U.S. in the fields of politics, economy, education, gender, entertainment, communication, art, and ultimately ordinary people's psychology. The Cold War becomes culture war (Robin 2001; Saunder 1999; Whitfield 1996).

As Westad indicated, the Cold War "was a clash of ideas and cultures as much as a military and strategic conflict...By 1945, these ideas – individual liberty, anti-collectivism, and market values on the U.S. side; social justice, collectivism, and state planning among the Soviets – had hardened into ideologies, in which universalist political ideals mixed freely with older and more specific cultural traits" (2015, 13). It is notable these days that the Cold War historiography puts more emphasis on the cultural and identity aspects of the period. More focus is put on "ideas, identities, and the contest for cultural hegemony" and this "allows for an inclusive characterization of the Cold War as an all-round strategic and ideological conflict for defining, steering, and shaping the future, first of Europe and then – at least hypothetically – of the world" (Romero 2014, 689).

Also scholars distinguish the culture of the Cold War in the third world from that of the great powers, especially the United States and the former Soviet Union. "We decenter from a primarily Euro-Atlantic focus to the complex heterogeneity of the global South, and from a close frame on the superpowers' decision-makers to the agency of a variety of actors in Latin America, Asia or Africa. And we enlarge the field from the customary subjects of diplomacy, security and ideology onto a bracing assortment of trans-national and domestic, cultural and social, human rights and media, economic and intellectual history approaches" (Romero 2014, 686).

Even in the United States, the Cold War culture cannot be defined as a monolithic one. According to McEnaney, "it was the diversity, plurality, and the decentralized individuality of postwar American society – the very characteristics celebrated by Cold War boosters – that made Cold War political culture less sturdy and steady than its adherents had hoped" (2015, 441).

Then, we need a cultural approach to the Cold War. International relations scholars tend to emphasize the international systemic variable and national interests in explaining the evolution of the Cold War, and national strategies in the period. However, as more culture oriented approaches such as constructivism suggests, "Identity and interest can shape each other or even merge. Each side's interest in many questions was defined in part by its identity, and the interactions of the contending interests in turn affected each side's sense of self" (Jervis 2015, 32). According to Jervis, the evolution and the mixture of conflict and cooperation between two camps can be explained from the perspective of identity politics. We expect "expect the Cold War to be at its most bitter when identity is under most pressure and, conversely, cooperative policies to be pursued when identities are secure" (Jervis 2015, 29).

South Korea's Cold War culture was even more complicated. South Korea, as one of the Third World countries, has the elements of Cold War culture of superpowers, with its specific features. Structurally, the Cold War of South Korea overlapped with post-colonial reconstruction, economic development with market economy, establishment of developmental state, the formation of civil society, and westernization. Structural bipolarity and cultural aspects of the Cold War interacted with South Korea's own structure, complicating the relationship between structure

and culture.

Theoretically the relation between structure and culture is a complicated one. Culture may be defined as “the way of life, worldview, belief system, the codes of norms of behavior for an entire society comprising language, symbols, religion, morality, law and other institutions.” Then, culture, is more than anything else, norm or system of norms to view, interpret, and constitute the given situation and the events. Norms describe collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity. Having constitutive and regulative effects, norms define/constitute identities, or prescribe/regulate behavior, or they do both (Goldstein and Keohane 1993).

First, norms delineate boundaries. Norms define we vs. them, identity vs. others, the boundary of nationhood and territory. Beyond defining a nation's homeland, norms also establish buffer zones, neutralized areas, and spheres of influence. Second, norms serve as signposts or heuristic mental aids to warn policymakers of the prearranged actions that various states will take under certain circumstances. Third, like standard operating procedures, norms routine many facets of domestic, national and transnational relations. They establish a context for interpreting the policy signals sent by others, and the surrounding environments, and thus make it easier to monitor agreements. Choices are therein simplified and transaction costs reduced. Finally, and especially, international norms, such as global and regional Cold War norms, can perform a tripwire function. Should a widely accepted rule be violated, attention can be focused on the transgression so that a collective response can be more easily mobilized. In sum, international norms will tell domestic actors who shall play the political game, what the playing board will look like, and which moves are acceptable.

Also once cultures and norms are constructed internationally, they influence the domestic and foreign policy. First, norms may weigh on the conscience of national leaders, inducing them to decide in favor of some policy because of its normative implications. Second, social interest groups may rally around certain norms when pressuring a government to adopt a particular policy. Third, external consultants and advisors with recognized expertise in a certain domain may sway debates over different policy options by appealing to various norms. Fourth, the injunctions communicated by international norms may become institutionalized in national law and the administrative regulations of domestic agencies. In sum, international structure, culture and norms can affect a nation's culture and policy paradigms because governmental and nongovernmental actors may promote them (Raymond 1997; Finnemore 1998). This is a kind of ideational theory in the sense that “the content of a cognitive structure influences actors' responses to a choice situation, and in which that cognitive structure is not wholly endogenous to objective, material features of the choice situation being explained” (Jacobs 2015, 43).

Next, structure, especially, as the embodiment of social power networks, is concretized in military, economic, ideational and political fields. The imperative of social structure is internalized in the minds of human agency in the form of culture and subcultures in different fields. Human agency, on the other hand, with or without intention, produces, reproduces, and transforms social structure, with the effect of changing social culture. Structure embeds culture, yet once culture is formed, it acquires its own inertial to affect the social structure with its own relative autonomous power (Lapid and Kratochwil 1992; Wendt 1992).

To analyze culture, therefore, it is necessary to know the mutually constitutive process between structure and culture. South Korea's culture during the times of Cold War is formed

with analytically different social structures having their own logics. It is true to say that it has the feature of general Cold War culture, but more than just Cold War culture, South Korea retains more diverse cultures. Then, South Korea's culture during the times of Cold War needs to be distinguished from South Korea's Cold War culture itself.

Table 1 structure and culture

Social structures in South Korea during the Cold War ^①	Culture in South Korea during the Cold War ^②		Cold War Culture in South Korea ^③
Political Structure: authoritarian regime vs. movement of democratization ^④	Political Culture: nationalism/collectivism vs. democratic way of life ^⑤		Political: strong authoritarianism and collectivism ^⑥
Economic Structure: capitalist development with developmental state ^⑦	Economic Culture: centralism with limited market liberalism ^⑧	⇒	Economic: state-capital centralism ^⑨
Military Structure: highly militarized divided state ^⑩	Military Culture: social militarism ^⑪		Military: Strong and all-faceted militarism ^⑫
Ideational Structure: post-Confucian, post-traditional westernization, esp. strong influence of the US ^⑬	Ideational Culture: the mixture of communitarianism and rising individualism ^⑭		Ideational: anti-communism and collectivism ^⑮

Historical Evolution of the Cold War Culture in South Korea

South Korean Culture during the Cold War changed according to the interaction of various subsequent cultures, and the evolution of Cold War structure at both global and regional level. Politically, authoritarianism established strong foothold in Korea after liberation from Japanese colonialism, later to be challenged by the movement of democratization from the civil society. Economically, capitalist economy took the form of developmental economy with strong guide of developmental state and strong support from the U.S.. Militarily, high level of militarization of the Peninsula was inevitable in both Koreas due to the high level of confrontation. Ideationally, Confucianism which was still influential, provided South Koreans with normative framework for private life, neo-familist political culture, state-guided economy, and communitarian social life(Ha, 1999). However, with the development of liberal democracy and market economy, individualism influenced by Western civilization especially by the U.S. slowly changed the mental framework of South Koreans.

The evolution of the Cold War structure and culture at international level, and various events guided the orientation of South Korean culture. Global and regional Cold War reinforced and supported authoritarian government with collectivist culture, in turn co-opted by South Korean governments themselves. Strong developmental state tried to prove its legitimacy based on its effectiveness in economic development. In this process, labor had been severely oppressed with partly proper vigilance and partly excessive concern about the influence of socialism and

Table 2 The evolution and change of South Korean Cold War Culture

^{a)} Period ^{a)}	1945. 8 ~ 1950. 6 (from liberation to Korean War) ^{a)}	1950. 6 ~ 1960. 4 (from Korean War to the end of the First Republic) ^{a)}	1960. 4 ~ 1961. 5 (the Second Republic) ^{a)}	1961. 5 ~ 1979.10.26 ^{a)} (Park Chung Hee Regime) ^{a)}	1979.10 ~ 1991. 12 (The Second Cold War until the Basic Agreement) ^{a)}	1992. 1 ~ 2000. 6 (International Post- Cold War, and inter- Korean tension) ^{a)}	2000. 6 ~ (reconciliation and exchange) ^{a)}
Major Events^{a)}	Liberation; divided government ^{a)}	Korean War; authoritarian regime; initiation of market economy ^{a)}	April Democratic revolution; parliamentary gov't; societal unification movement ^{a)}	Military Coup d'état; Vietnam war; authoritarian regime; détente; developmental state ^{a)}	Kwangju democratic movement; Second Cold War; Collapse of the USSR ^{a)}	Inter-Korean basic agreement; democratic gov't; 1 st nuclear crisis; US unipolarity; financial crisis ^{a)}	Inter-Korean summit meeting and Sunshine policy; 9.11 terror; 2 nd nuclear crisis; ^{a)}
Structural Change^{a)}	Division of the Peninsula; beginning of two-camp rivalry ^{a)}	Hot War confrontation; political authoritarianism; weak economy; ROK-US alliance; beginning of liberalism ^{a)}	Political democratization; strong civil society; rise of liberalism; weak economy ^{a)}	Strong authoritarian rule; developmental state led economy; heavy militarism; nationalism/ collectivism ^{a)}	Political democratization; inter-Korean dialogue; influence of international post- Cold War transition ^{a)}	Inter-Korean tension; engaging with the North; economic liberalization; liberal individualism ^{a)}	Inter-Korean reconciliation; counter-proliferation stance; change in US- ROK relations ^{a)}
Cultural Change^{a)}	Weak authoritarianism; ideological confusion; nationalism; anti- communism ^{a)}	Strong anti- communism; militarism; nationalism; collectivism ^{a)}	Ideological revisionism; liberalism; individualism ^{a)}	Strong authoritarianism; nationalism; anti- communism; militarism; collectivism; developmentalism ^{a)}	Nationalism; militarism; liberalism; developmentalism ^{a)}	De-militarism; nationalism for unification; liberalism ^{a)}	Liberalism; one- national nationalism; partial anti- Americanism ^{a)}

communism. Labor movement for wage increase, better work environments, and political voice had been prevented in almost all administrations. Militarism was one of the most salient phenomena in South Korea, reinforced by Cold War structure. Every corner of the society was transformed for military effectiveness and for military emergency. Military metaphor and mentality dominated South Koreans' minds affecting education, media, art, entertainments, and morality. Burgeoning individualism and liberalism lost their grounds with special emphasis on the collectivist need to fight against communism, the staunch proponent of which is the main security threat, North Korea.

Events on the Peninsula such as the establishment of divided governments(1948), the Korean War(1950), Democratic Revolution(1960), military coup d'état(1961), South Korea's participation to the Vietnam War(1960's), partial withdrawal of U.S. troops(1971), mini-détente on the Peninsula (1972), the assassination of Park Chung Hee and democratic movements (1980), Nordpolitik(1988), inter-Korean basic agreements(1992), inter-Korean summit(2000) directed the course of South Korean Cold War culture and its transformation. These events are, to be sure, influenced and partly formed by international Cold War events, such as d'étente, the Second Cold War(1980), and the collapse of the Soviet Union. In what follows are the changing courses of South Korean Cold War culture.

Period 1: From Liberation to the Outbreak of the Korean War (1945. 8 ~ 1950. 6)

This period is characterized by the establishment and institutionalization of the Cold War structure and culture both at the international and domestic level. At the international level, the dominant influences of both the U.S. and the USSR on the liberated Korea, and their subsequent Cold War confrontation made inter-Korean relations and their respective culture and identities as ideologically and materially incompatible and antagonistic. The growing antagonism between the U.S. and USSR from the agreement to divide Korea into U.S. and Soviet occupation zones along the 38th parallel to the foundation of two separate governments in each Korea in 1948 strengthened the Cold War identity in both Koreas. Two superpowers had held several ministerial talks to reach an agreement on the Korean issue, only to fail and ruin the future meeting(Heo 2008). The Soviets and the Americans both tried to induce Koreans to follow their respective forms of government in building separate governments. The North became communist, and the South became somewhat democratic(Armstrong 2003).

Besides the structural change at the international level, there were conflicts among political elites. Ideological and cultural conflicts, the origin of which can be traced back to the times of the independence movement under Japanese colonialism, between nationalists and communists contributed to the inter-elite antagonism after the liberation. The cultural identities and norms relevant to inter-Korean relations, reunification policy, and foreign policy mainly towards the U.S. and the USSR were formed as the inter-elite competition among the various nationalist, and communist factions was intensified.

On the other hand, there was a political force to represent and realize the idea of "one, unified nation" which has existed more than 1,000 years as a unified Korea. Some of the political leaders who assumed official positions in the government-in-exile before liberation, especially nationalists such as Kim Ku, help to construct a "one-nation" identity among Koreans.

Peasants and workers who did not comprehend western-originated ideology supported the norms coming from the one-nation identity. Although this norm and political culture did not remain as a dominant one after the Korean War, it survived and came to the fore whenever the official reunification policy of the authoritarian regimes was challenged, forming the identity politics between the political elites and the public.

In this period, diverging affinity and animosity of two Koreas towards two superpowers, respectively, helped a lot culture the Cold War in two Koreas at the initial period of Cold War. Also actual division of the territory and the nation formalized the antagonistic feature of the Cold War, which, except China, Austria, Germany, and few other states, characterized particular process of culturing the Korean Cold War. Korean societies which did not actually have the experience of establishing democratic civil society, and modern nation-state by the end of Japanese colonialism, had also the characteristic of the Cold War mentality from above. Norms and world views determining how Koreans would fight the Cold War tended to be made from above, with the guidance of the state sector.

Period 2: from the Korean War to the end of the First Republic (1950. 6 ~ 1960. 4)

One of the most distinguishing characteristics of Korean Cold War is that Koreans underwent “hot” war: hot war among the former national brethren, supported by two superpowers. Social psychologists argue that traumatic experiences such as depressions, wars may bring about special, and enduring ideas to have the formative and constitutive effects on the future perception of many important issues. It is because these events constitute exogenous shocks that undermine the existing order. The Korean War was a turning point not only because of the real change in international and inter-Korean balance of material power, but also because of the change in culture, norms, and identity of two Koreans. After the Korean War, shifts in the agenda of politics and foreign policy occurred to a greater degree, and two Koreas reinforced policy paradigms which facilitated the antagonism against the other.

The real experience of the Korean War put an end to the possibility of open competition among diverse political culture including nationalism, liberalism, communism, ideas for unification. Communist or socialists in South Korea, and nationalist in North Korea who had preserved narrow political space, had lost the ground. For South Koreans, the Korean War reinforced the norm of anti- communism, pro-Americanism, and the process of internalization of liberal democratic values through the form of authoritarianism. President Lee Syng Man made explicit the most crucial policy of attacking the North recovering the lost territory beyond the DMZ. Also the ROK-US alliance was concluded in 1953, making the military, strategic ties fundamentally strong, then politico-socio-cultural ties also stronger. The Cold War situation made these ideas as a sort of civic- or quasi-religion. Situation was the same in the North: opposite norms and identity, anti-American imperialism, and anti-capitalism were formed in North, as well. The alliance relationship was also formed among North Korea, the USSR, and the PRC. The predominance and the persistent strengthening of the Cold War culture meant the radical weakening of the one-nation identity, and the diverse ideas about reunification at the social level.

Subsequently, two-camp image was developed, leading to ethical dualism. A clear distinction

was drawn between friends and enemies. The confrontation between friends and enemies became transformed into a sort of religious war. Every discourse favorable to communism, or even neutral to communism was strictly prohibited. Literature and music produced by North Koreans or even South Koreans who crossed the border toward North Korea were prohibited as well. This Cold War anti-communism developed into aggressive nationalism. It is the notion of a “selected nation to fight against communism in the front.”

Period 3: the Second Republic(1960. 4 ~ 1961. 5)

This period shows interesting development of South Korean Cold War culture. The downfall of the Syngman Rhee regime by the fierce movement of democracy from below, and the establishment of the Second Republic and a vibrant civil society, changed the course of culturing the Cold War to some extent. During the period of Second Republic, the Cold War culture “from above” had been questioned by the public, changing fundamental normative basis which formerly formed Cold War culture during the 1950s: new perceptions and strategic culture toward the North and unification, and new perception of international relations such as U.S.-Korean relations.

The government, as a response, proposed a new reunification policy centering on the idea of a “general election in both Koreas under UN supervision.” However, various public organizations proposed more radical reforms in North Korea policy and foreign policy, especially reunification policy. They stressed the importance of one-nation culture and art, and changed their perception of anti-communism, though in a limited way. Proposals such as “reunification through neutralization,” “inter-Korean negotiation,” “inter-Korean exchange” were presented. Radical organizations for reunification such as the Central Association for National, Independent Reunification, Allied Association for Reunification through Neutralization, Alliance for National Reunification, and National Student Association for Reunification. In particular, National Student Association for Reunification, founded on May 5, 1961, with a membership of 17 universities, tried to hold a North-South Student meeting.

From this experience comes an observation that the vitalization of democracy from below and civil society in South Korea entailed a growing demand for the diversification of the discussion of North Korea policy, foreign policy, and reunification policy. Due to the short duration of the Second Republic, however, the cultural identity based on the notion of “one-nation” deviated from the Cold War ideology did not gain political momentum.

Period 4: From the Third Republic to the Basic Agreement (1961. 5 ~ 1979. 10)

The Third Republic

The most distinctive feature of South Korean culture during the period was created and institutionalized during the Park Chung Hee era. Structural features of modern South Korea such as political authoritarianism, militarism, developmental economy, mixture of collectivism and individualism, with a strong support of international and strong Cold War structure and also of the U.S., helped culture South Korean Cold War.

International events such as the intensification of the Vietnam War, the Cuban missile crisis, the Pueblo crisis, the Nixon Doctrine and a new Asia policy of the U.S., détente, diplomatic normalization of the U.S. and China, and Japan and China, was intertwined with the evolution of the Cold War in Korea. Events such as the dispatch of South Korean armies to the Vietnam War (from early 1964 to the early 1970's), North Korea's failed attempt to assassinate President Park, partial withdrawal of U.S. troops (1971), mini-détente on the Peninsula (1972), returning inter-Korean antagonism, Park's attempt to develop nuclear weapons and the U.S. opposition, and finally assassination of President Park by one of his cadre members (1979).

During the Park period, South Korea underwent fundamental and rapid modernization in every aspect of society. This modern transformation had engendered very specific features by being combined with the structure of the Cold War: in a word, industrial and modern transformation under the Cold War. Political authoritarianism was legitimated by successful performance of economic development on one hand, and also backed up by the Cold War structure: that is, the need to keep political unitary consensus on most issues to effectively cope with communist threats from the North. Park's attempt to revise the constitution to perpetuate his authoritarian rule was legitimated by stressing the changing form of Cold War. With new Asia policy of the U.S. after Vietnamese fiasco, the U.S. attempt to leave Asians' security to Asians' hands, and also to withdraw important part of the U.S. troops from the U.S., helped Park to legitimately revise the constitution overcoming political oppositions.

The combination of the Cold War and political authoritarianism was also manifest in other parts of the society: militarism, suppression of labor, and collectivist ideology. As military weakness, social ineffectiveness based on decentralization, and the rise of labor movement—even though it is just and understandable—symbolizes the weakening of the preparedness of South Korea against the North, Cold War justified militarism, suppression of labor, and collectivist ideology.

Then, this period is characterized by the reinforcement of the Cold War culture and identity on the Korean Peninsula both at the elite and public level. Political recruitment, education, political communication through public media, art, entertainment, social institution, and so on, had been colored by the Cold War ideology. Uniform world views and belief system was infused by the state sector, and new cultural codes and normative frameworks had been produced by the government. With the transformation of the state not just as institutional power, but also as a norm producer, and that of the public as the passive recipient of state-produced norms and views, the process of culturing the Cold War in South Korea resulted in a very peculiar one.

Regarding South Korea's North Korea policy and reunification policy, the norm of winning the Cold War and the arms race took precedence over the norm of reconciliation, cooperation, and unification, despite the global and regional movement toward détente from the late 1960's. As opposed to the notion of recovering the identity of the traditional "one-nation," South Korea in this period, constituted the image of the North as the main and irreconcilable enemy, threat, danger, or "otherness," resulting in negative collective identification between the two Koreas.

Mini-détente on the Peninsula and some changes

The so-called Nixon doctrine which declared American retrenchment from East Asia after the long period of painful involvement in the Vietnam War had enormous impact upon East Asian

security landscape. The Nixon administration required Asian allies to depend upon their own defense policy, only to be supported by American nuclear extended deterrence. South Korea, in addition to this policy change, had to face the withdrawal of the part of the USFK and was forced to make reconciliatory arrangement with the North based on the agreement between Washington and Beijing. Park Chung Hee, however, was tremendously suspicious of North Korea's genuine intention, and did not fully lower the defensive guard both in military and ideological terms. The rapprochement happened from the later 1971, with the result of 1972 Joint Communiqué, but did not continue more than two years.

Then, despite the short break of detente, which lacked any genuine change in the material balance of power and ideological systems, this robust perception of the other was not diminished. The 1972 Joint Communiqué mentioned three basic principles of reunification of independence, peace and national cooperation, but it failed to bring about new practical norms to transform the state of armistice to the state of peace. There was no mention of the recognition of and the respect for the system of the other Korea. After the failure of détente in later 1973, two Koreas recovered the Cold War identity and concentrated on developing military preparedness. This fact shows that great powers' agreement and pressure do not automatically translate into their small parties' rapprochement, and some structural changes at the regional level has faced staunch resistance from the cultural inertia from small powers.

Period 5: From the Second Cold War to the Basic Agreement (1979. 10 ~ 1991.12)

The 1980s in South Korea shows increasing conflict between political authoritarianism and liberal democracy, one between economic development by the state and economic liberalization, one between militarism and civilians' attempt to regain social hegemony, and the one between collectivism and liberalism. It is true that serious and active democratic movement in 1980 had been severely oppressed by Chun Doo Whan's militaristic rulership, and subsequent efforts toward democratization had been oppressed by the militaristic, authoritarian government. However, social atmosphere changed a lot. The growing civil society in universities, labor sectors, religious groups, interest groups, and political groups helped the transformation of the society, and that coincided with the weakening of Cold War culture in South Korea.

With the reform movement of the USSR from 1985, and expectation of South Korea that reform and change might happen in North Korea and communist camps, reinforced the public opinion that we need to get over the Cold War culture (Checkel 1997).

From Dongsung Kim's study on nationalism, we find out that, from the survey data from 1960s to 1980s, the components of nationalism for South Koreans are as follows: reunification (25%), popular sovereignty (17.1%), national autonomy (14.5%), and modernization (11.8%). From the 1980s we have new components of Korean nationalism for foreign affairs. "Overcoming dependence" and "opposition to foreign intervention" are growing concerns (Dongsung Kim 1995).

The existence of this strong desire for unification and national autonomy that is somewhat deviated from the Cold War culture, identity and norms become more salient with the passage of time. Here the factor of democratization becomes crucial. With the development of democracy from the late 1980s in South Korea, as manifested in the revision of the Constitution for direct

vote for Presidential election(1987), Seoul Olympics(1988), and demands from the civil society became central elements both in maintaining political regimes and constructing national culture and identity more generally. The limited influence of organizations in civil society, mainly student movements, trade unions, and NGOs began to expand.

Period 6: International Post-Cold War and persistent inter-Korean tensions (1992 ~ 2000.6)

The end of the Cold War confrontation at the global level fundamentally changed the two Korea's security environments and their positions in the international distribution of material power. The collapse of the communist bloc, subsequent economic hardship of isolated North Korea, the emergence of new diplomatic relations (the establishment of diplomatic relations between South Korea and the PRC, and Russia, and the deteriorating relations between North Korea and the PRC, Russia) all provided the two Koreas with the material basis on which new norms and identity could be founded. Especially for South Korea, three factors--that is, the weakening of the Cold War culture and identity at the global level, economic predominance over North Korea, and democratization by which diverse societal demands based on identities and norms different from the previous Cold War identity and norms arose--contributed to the emergence of the post-Cold War identity and norms. Even though more radical identity change towards post-Cold War situation at the global level was not directly transplanted to the domestic level, this post-Cold War identity and norms competed with the still existing Cold War confrontation and hostilities. The existence of this competition is why many students of inter-Korean relations regard the Korean Peninsula as the last country suffering from the Cold War confrontation.

It appears that the change in international cultural and identity politics, the rise of the post-Cold War identity in South Korea, at least in part, contributed to the emergence of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchange and Cooperation between South and North Korea, better known as the Basic Agreement(1992). Now the objectives of the two Koreas include peaceful coexistence, avoidance of military confrontation, socio-cultural exchange, and family reunions. At least literally, new norms of mutual recognition of and respect for each other's systems emerged, and the renunciation of military force as means of policy towards each other appeared as well. Under these renewed norms, new concepts of mutual interests such as cooperation and exchanges were formed.

Yet, there is no clear evidence that this reconciliatory move from the North Korea came about through a change of its identity and its norms in inter-Korean relations. Despite the material change in the international distribution of power at the global level, North Korea did not show reliable evidence of changes in fundamental principles and norms of foreign policy. Rather, the intention to overcome its diplomatic isolation and to elicit economic aid to improve its economic situation worked as a more fundamental motive. Its identity and norms were not being reconstructed from within; rather the interest-maximizing tactics were changed based on the persistent Cold War culture.

These structural changes had been intermingled with quite new political, social, and economic transformation of South Korean society. With political democratization, South

Korean civil society grew very rapidly to end military authoritarianism, and engendered civil governments which are very responsive to political demands from civil society. With the decrease of North Korea's military, conventional threats, even with the nuclear crisis, South Korea's need to maintain high level of military preparedness decreased together with social militarist culture. South Korean society rapidly experienced social de-militarization. The financial crisis in 1997 fundamentally questioned the effectiveness and legitimacy of developmental state and related state apparatus. The tide of liberalization swept South Korea very deeply, leading to the new mood to adapt to post-Cold War economic logic such as liberalization, globalization, and information technology revolution. Then, politico-military persistence of the Cold War structure on the Peninsula coexisted with socio-economic-cultural post-Cold War transition in a uncomfortable fashion, resulting in Sunshine policy under Kim Dae Jung administration.

Period 7: Reconciliation and exchange between two-Koreas (2000. 6 ~ 2007. 12)

Based on overall changes in the 1990's, Kim Dae-jung administration began its own engagement policy toward the North, and this symbolizes the post-Cold War transition in most difficult issue areas. The core of the policy had been inherited by Roh Moo Hyun in the form of the Policy of Peace and Prosperity. These engagement policies partially succeeded in transforming the Cold War structure and culturing post-Cold War in South Korean society.

According to the Sunshine policy, South Korea, on the basis of the norms of mutual recognition and peaceful coexistence, would not try to absorb North Korea. Furthermore, the norms of cooperation and reconciliation would continue to be observed. Kim Dae-jung who spent most of his political career in the opposition party, responded strongly to societal demands for reunification, and the need to use North Korea's security threat for the regime's advantage diminished.

Then, inter-Korean summit meeting in 2000, may be viewed as a natural policy outcome. Astonishing progress in inter-Korean exchange in every field shows structural changes in inter-Korean relations. Also striking is South Koreans' change in the perception of the North, unification, the future of the Korea, and its relationship with foreign powers, especially the U.S. South Koreans emphasized more national independence, self-reliance, equal relationship with the U.S., the need to augment inter-Korean exchange, which might finally lead to peaceful unification of the Peninsula. The second summit meeting took place in October, 2007, producing many promises to foster inter-Korean economic and socio-cultural exchanges.

The question is the nature of North Korea's change. North Korea's foreign policy from the previous period pursued two objectives: economic pragmatism to maximize its economic gain to revive its economy, and opportunistic militarism, such as nuclear crisis, to use military means as the main leverage of foreign policy, especially to gain a superior position in negotiation. However, a militaristic approach does not seem to be sufficient to solve North Korea's economic hardships.

The purpose of North Korea's cultural and identity politics in this period is to show its changed identity with more peaceful intentions and norms of reconciliation. It has the effect of lessening the level of precaution and animosity of other countries, especially countries from

which North Korea wants to receive economic aid and to foster cooperation. By building an intersubjective, cooperative collective identity, North Korea can alleviate the security dilemma and convince other countries of its peaceful intention. Then, these countries would not worry about facing an increased military threat from North Korea, which might have been possible through the misuse of their own economic aid.

The point here is whether North Korea will take advantage of post-Cold War culturing process as a tactical device to disarm other powers. It is still open to question whether North Korea itself will respond to South Korea's transformation to post-Cold War cultural paradigm, or whether the North transforms its own identity from the Cold War identity to a post-Cold War identity and internalize the norm of mutual recognition and abandonment of military means as its foreign policy. It is true that the radical change in international environment contributed to the change of North Korea's foreign policy, but the delayed change to a post-Cold War identity—about 10 years from the end of global Cold War—reduced the significance of this factor.

Conclusion

International structure and the way great powers culture the structure wield tremendous influence on small states and people: how they interpret the world, themselves, security, threat, and the other. Lacking autonomous power to change the structure, small states try to adapt themselves to those imposed structure with some revision and reformulation.

Endogenous structures and culture are inevitably mixed with the imposed international structure producing very specific culture. How different structures are put together is crucial for the nature of the subsequent structural and cultural product. The Cold War structure and culture at global and regional level has been combined with endogenous structures and culture for each region and countries. How the Cold War worked to reinforce or weaken certain parts of the society, has been critical in shaping individual states' Cold War culture.

South Korean culture during the Cold War times has been formulated not just by globally pervasive cultural aspects, but also by innate, ongoing structural development, in this case, modernizing process. South Korean Cold War culture was the combination of these various cultures. Political authoritarianism, developmental economy, militarism, and westernization were organically combined with the Cold War structure and culture.

As South Korea was a divided, modernizing, small country which experienced “hot” war, the Cold War culture has been more pervasive, persistent, and deeply rooted. Still the Peninsula is divided, with the persistence of Cold War type confrontation between two Koreas. With different degrees and aspects of post-Cold War transition in two Koreas, different issue areas, the remnants of the Cold War culture still operate in limited fields, waiting to be overcome.

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