# A Normative Reflection on Korean ODA Policy: Self-Regards, Duty, and Obligation

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Abstract With the increasing role of East Asian countries in global efforts for poverty reduction and development, an important question has emerged about their policy rationale for international development cooperation. Are East Asian countries using international development for their own economic and commercial advantage, or are they really pursuing the goal of global justice? This paper seeks to answer the question with reference to normative values and ideas, shedding light on the normative aspects of Korean official development assistance (ODA) policy. It first discusses normative theories that construct the moral duty and ethical obligation for international development assistance in order to set a normative reference. Secondly, this paper reviews the underlying policy rationale of Korean ODA. It argues that Korean ODA is strongly self-regarding, as Korean people have a very strong sense of pride about it, while they also feel an obligation towards international development assistance. In conclusion, this paper suggests a three-pronged approach to Korean ODA for the future, while incorporating the strength of Korean development experience and knowledge: aid for human freedom, aid for socio-economic and political development, and aid for the global public good.

**Keywords** Korean ODA moral duty obligation self-regards global public good

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#### **Introduction**

Despite economic growth and global fights against poverty, a large number of people in the world still suffer not only from poverty but also hunger and disease. Increasing numbers of natural disasters aggravate problems caused by social conflicts in many developing countries. It is true that affluent countries have tried hard to share the burden of global responsibility for poverty reduction in conjunction with global efforts such as the UN's Millennium Development Goals and Sustainable Development Goals. Global efforts have made great impacts over the last few decades. The number of extreme poor was halved from 1.9 billion in 1990 to 836 million in 2015 (United Nations 2015). Nevertheless, tremendous challenges for development remain at the global level. The majority of people who still live in extreme poverty are highly concentrated in countries where political and economic situations are fragile or conflict ridden. In many places in the world, such as Syria and Venezuela, innocent people are killed or injured, and their livelihoods are destroyed. There seems to be a clear imperative for the international community to work together to tackle such global challenges.

In East Asia, nations have joined forces in this global endeavour. Japan as one of the leading members of the influential Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in the Organization of Economic Cooperation Development (OECD), and the Republic of Korea (hereafter Korea), have played significant roles in international development. Korea officially became a donor country in the community of international development cooperation. In 2018, the share of official development assistance (ODA) was 0.14% of Korea's gross national income (GNI), or about USD 23 billion (OECD 2019). In terms of the actual size and proportion to the GNI, Korea's ODA expenditure is small compared to other major donor countries and is currently ranked 24th out of 29 OECD/DAC members (OECD 2019).

With the increasing role of East Asian countries in global efforts for poverty reduction and development, an important question has emerged about their policy rationale for international development cooperation. Are East Asian countries using international development for their own economic and commercial advantage, or are they really pursuing the goal of global justice? A body of literature looks into the characteristics of international development cooperation in these countries (Lancaster 2007; Stallings 2017). Existing studies tend to show that commercial advantage has been a main priority in international development cooperation in Japan and Korea. In 2018, according to the Commitment to Development Index, Korea was at the bottom among 27 countries, while Japan was ranked in 24th place (Center for Global Development 2019). While Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands, as well as Sweden, are seen as high-level donors, Korea and Japan are seen as doing very little in terms of the contribution to poverty reduction and economic development in developing countries (Hulme 2015). What are Korea and Japan doing in terms of their international development cooperation if their commitment to development has been so low?

Such questions can be answered through empirical investigation, but if we put these questions to ourselves as East Asian citizens about future ODA policy, moral and ethical reflection are required for us to answer. Why should we, citizens and the government of East Asian nations, support developing countries in their own development? How should we implement international development policy? These questions should be answered with reference to normative values and ideas. This paper aims to shed light on the normative aspects of Korean ODA policy.

Although Korea is still seen as an emerging donor, it has been ten years since Korea became an official member of the OECD/DAC. For the first decade since its membership, Korea has tried hard to follow international rules and guidelines, including the OECD/DAC guidelines (Stallings 2017). This was reasonable for a country which began engaging in ODA as a new member. Nevertheless, entering the second decade as an OECD/DAC member, Korea needs a normative rationale and a clear sense of purpose for its ODA policy which are consistent with the global norms of foreign development assistance. For such reasons, it must be the right time to reflect on Korea's ODA policy experience and contemplate future policy directions. Such normative and theoretical questions are pertinent since there has been increasing criticism that Korea lacks a clear sense of purpose and vision in international development policy. This lack of a common vision and sense of purpose can easily lead to fragmentation in the policy system of international development cooperation if the various policy actors involved do not share a clear vision or goal for international development cooperation.

In the next section, this paper will discuss different theoretical and normative arguments for international development cooperation, especially in the context of ODA. Since ODA is carried out through the government with financing generated through taxation, this paper will assume the state to be an ethical agent responsible for international obligation with domestic responsibility in terms of its relationship with citizens. In particular, it is necessary to set ethical grounds for the state to conduct ODA as an ethical agency, which will be different from those for individuals as a moral agency. In this paper we will use the notion of moral duty to refer to a duty drawing on individual internal moral values, while the notion of ethical obligation will refer to compulsory requirements stemming from the relationship between members of the community (Harsanyi 1982). This paper will also use the notion of self-regarding rationale in order to refer to the considerations of self-respect as well as self-interest such as diplomatic and economic self-interest (Lancaster 2007). In the following section, this paper will review Korean ODA policy and reflect on it to find out what kind of policy rationale has manifested during the last decade. It will be an attempt to discern the normative grounds of Korean ODA policy and discuss its background and characteristics. Drawing on the discussion and review in the previous sections, this paper seeks to set out an international development policy rationale for Korea for the future.

## Why should a nation support other countries through ODA?

In his seminal paper, Singer argues that 'if it is in our power to prevent something bad happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it' (Singer 1972: 231). According to this point of view, proximity or distance does not matter if a person needs help, whether this is a neighbour's child or someone in Bengal. It is a moral duty that should be applied to everyone equally without considering nationality (Hulme 2016), no matter whether the person lives in a Western country or an East Asian country such as Korea or Japan. This simple but powerful argument sets out a moral

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Interview with Professor Eunmee Kim, a leading expert in the field of Korean ODA. The interview was conducted on 5 November 2019.

basis for international cooperation in terms of moral duty. Singer shows that humanitarian work is not charity but duty. Moral people should do their moral duty (Singer 1972).

If we recall the most devastating natural disasters in recent years, for instance the Aceh tsunami in Indonesia in 2004 and typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines in 2013, people from all over the world, no matter whether they lived in neighbouring countries or faraway nations, came together to provide relief to those affected. They sought to fulfil their moral duty. Individuals as moral agents should participate in supporting people suffering from poverty and natural disaster in other countries. Nevertheless, people who do not fulfil their moral duty are not forced to do so, but may be morally blamed. All activities to help other people, however, may not come out of moral duty. One may do so out of self-regarding considerations. It is possible to help others to gain respect or to earn economic reward. Such self-regarding considerations may not be bad, but cannot be praised unless they are combined with other-regarding moral duty to help others with priority (Sen 1993).

It is necessary to note that moral duty is weaker than ethical obligation. Passers-by could certainly help a child who fell into a river, but they may not have an obligation to provide help to those in faraway places suffering from a serious natural disaster. They are not obliged to do so although it is still a moral duty. In terms of justice as fairness, however, it is an ethical obligation to provide support to those in the worst position. According to Rawls, those in the worst position have a legitimate claim to the primary goods necessary for them to live as free and equal individuals. (Rawls 1982). The rest have to provide the necessary resources since they could be in such situations as well. Here it is very important to recognise why the moral duty to support those in need becomes a political obligation. In the Rawls theory of justice, individuals enter into a social contract which could represent the basis of an institutional framework for a political community, and under such a social contract the moral duty to support those in need becomes a stronger obligation. Extending this line of thinking, Nagel argues that such an obligation can only hold within a nation in which citizens set up a constitutional framework for rights and duties to each other under which they agree to be obliged (Nagel 2005). A corollary of this argument is that it is not an obligation to help the suffering poor living in distant places without sharing citizenship. An ethical theory based on individuals as a sole moral agency cannot provide a sufficient theoretical basis for international development assistance although it still has a strong appeal to us to help people in difficult situations.

Further, international development assistance is not only to support those in need, such as people suffering from humanitarian crises and severe poverty, but is also provided for economic and social development. As Sen defines development as freedom (Sen 1999), development is a process in which individuals acquire adequate functioning and capabilities to exercise their freedom. Even if there is no visible catastrophic humanitarian crisis, billions of people could be suffering from chronic poverty or other livelihood difficulties which prevent them from acquiring capabilities. From the point of view outlined by Singer, we may have a moral duty to support individuals who cannot exercise their freedom due to a lack of functioning and capabilities.

In order to exercise freedom, people also need to have options to choose and arenas in which they can exercise freedom, which are not necessarily attached to individuals (Ringen 2007). Political and economic institutions should be in place and civil rights must be protected so that individuals can have options and choices in terms of their own freedom. The social and economic

as well as physical environment should be set out for arenas wherein individuals can implement their life plans. A body of literature in development studies shows that people in many developing countries suffer from institutional and structural barriers to exercising their freedom (Kabeer and Cook 2000; Midgley 2014). In a nutshell, freedom hinges not only on individual capabilities but also on the social and economic development of society.

Is it, then, our moral duty as individual citizens, not to mention a political obligation, to provide help to others in distant countries to build social institutions and economic infrastructures which could ultimately enhance people's freedom? It is not, however, intuitively clear that there is a normative link between the moral duty and obligation of individual citizens and social and economic development in developing countries of which they are not citizens. Here we need to turn our attention to the state as an ethical agency.

As globalisation deepens, we as individuals can live our lives in the global arena to a greater extent than in previous periods in history. Nevertheless, the global order essentially remains between sovereign states, while other actors such as individuals, social groups, and private enterprises are engaged in global activities, by and large, with their attached nationality. There is no global government which can define the rights and responsibilities of global citizens, and ordinary citizens should therefore be protected through their sovereign states in the global arena. As global rules and regulations are set up between sovereign states, there are rights and obligations to each other.

The global order has been forced by the powerful developed countries, according to Pogge (2008), and the plight of people in developing countries has therefore been caused by the developed countries. Through this argument, Pogge provides normative grounds for an ethical obligation to support development in developing countries. There are two critical points from the viewpoint of our discussion. First, if harm is caused by the global order which is unfairly imposed on developing countries, it is necessary to reform the global order. International development assistance would only perpetuate unfair order without serious efforts to reform such global order.

Secondly, it implies that a middle-sized country like Korea, which has never had a strong influence on the global order, does not have such an ethical obligation. Although it is a salient topic whether the global order is unfair to developing countries, Pogge's theory leaves us a great deal of room for empirical debates. Nevertheless, we may not need such a strong argument to expose the obligation of affluent countries for development. Looking back on the history of Korean economic development, for instance, it is very clear that Korea has benefited from the global economic and political order for the last sixty years since the 1960s. Korea's economic take-off is due to a great extent to an export-orient economic development strategy that was sustained through global free-trade regimes such as GATT and the WTO. In other words, the global order leaves some countries better off and others worse off. Given the global order within which sovereign states in the world interact with each other, those benefitting from it must have an ethical obligation to support those lagging behind to gain equal footing.

Once the state as an ethical agent enters into the field of international development assistance, we can begin to talk about official development assistance.<sup>2</sup> Donor government involvement is

Official Development Assistance (ODA) is defined as assistance to promote economic and social development of developing countries financed by donor countries' public expenditure, including grant and

necessary to catalyse the social and economic development of recipient countries. As an ethical agent, the state can provide support for the development of public institutions, which are critical requirements for sustainable long-term development, on top of humanitarian aid and support for individual freedom. Such efforts include building the institutions necessary for economic activities, the protection of human rights, and political participation. Building institutions for economic development and poverty reduction should be important policy goals, while democracy and effective government are important conditions to ensure individual freedom. The lesson we can elicit from the developmental state in Korea is the importance of effective public institutions for economic and social development (Adelman 1997). Since there are drawbacks and historical legacies of the developmental state with authoritarian characteristics, it is not desirable to adopt a wholesale form of the developmental state.

On the domestic front, the state has political responsibility and accountability to their citizens. If the government supports another country for economic and social development, public expenditure, financed by taxation, is used whether some citizens want to participate in such actions or not. They have no option other than following their government policy. They may, however, argue that priority should be given to their difficult situations. It is therefore necessary for governments to justify such efforts to their citizens. It is necessary to find out ways in which other-regarding activates such as ODA can be compatible with self-regarding requirements for own citizens.

Nevertheless, ODA is not only about benefitting other countries. This is the third reason that lays normative grounds for official development assistance. ODA can serve donor countries' national interests, which would, then, serve ordinary citizens. It is true that certain forms of tied aid, such as conditions to serve the national interests of donor countries, are not acceptable as the desired practice of ODA. It is also a very narrow form of national interest. National interests could be served by ODA, but in indirect ways through creating global public good. For instance, supporting international efforts to combat rainforest deforestation through ODA to developing countries in tropical regions will certainly serve foremost as a global public good, but it also serves national interests. As members of the global order, the states, especially affluent ones, have an obligation to contribute to the creation of global public good. Here the benchmark is whether ODA contributes to the global public good, which in turn serves national interests. National interest is not necessarily contradictory with global interest because the global public good benefits every nation equally and inclusively.

# A reflection on the implementation of Korean ODA

The state, as a moral agency, has an obligation as a member of the international community to help other countries and to contribute to global public goods. Assuming that this is the normative rationale of ODA, has the Korean ODA gone forward in this direction? In this section, in order to explore this question, the changing rationale of Korean ODA over the recent years will be reviewed. We examine policy ideas manifested in documents published after 2010, when Korea became a member of OECD/DAC, as well as interviews with public

officials who established such policy orientations.

As an emerging donor country, Korea has been perceived as setting a benchmark among developing countries in the international community. For many developing countries Korea provides a unique reference for development policy because Korea was previously one of the poorest countries in the world, and its development experiences remain vivid and relevant to developing countries (Kohli 2004; Kwon and Koo 2014). Public support for international development cooperation in Korea has been very solid, as policy makers and ordinary citizens alike are very proud that Korea has become a donor country helping other developing countries. According to the National Survey on ODA in 2017, 86.7% of Koreans support the provision of ODA. Since the National Survey on ODA was first conducted in 2011, 80 to 89% of citizens have supported ODA for the last decade (Park and Kim 2017).

As such, Korea has attracted the attention of the international community as an emerging donor, within a relatively short period of 10 years. At the global level, Korea has begun to play a significant role in the international development community. In 2011, Korea hosted the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, which called for development effectiveness in terms of the policy orientation of ODA. The Busan High-Level Forum is one of the biggest international policy forums convened in Korea, which symbolises the significance of Korea's new global status.

A question arising from this observation involves the policy rationale of Korean ODA. Since joining the OECD/DAC in 2010, Korea has implemented two five-year mid-term policy strategies following the Basic Law of International Development and Cooperation. The Basic Law, revised in 2014, stipulates the basic rationale of ODA policy in terms of human wellbeing and global prosperity.<sup>3</sup> Even though these values are universally desirable, they are too abstract and general to offer policy directions. Furthermore, the following action strategies were only target domestic policy actors. For example, the first mid-term strategy contains instructions on how to organize the aid system in Korea, such as developing detailed contents for a policy program and reorganizing the aid system effectively (Government of Korea 2010). The second mid-term strategy states the principle of integrated, substantial and participative ODA', which is also directed to domestic actors in Korea (Government of Korea 2015). International development cooperation policy needs to be based on a wider perspective of global public policy, in order to pursue global public goods, which target global citizens. However, Korea still establishes ODA strategy with policy objectives and targets which are mainly incorporated for domestic actors, as it is still considered as domestic policy. For this reason, at the stage of implementing international development cooperation, various public institutions within the Korean state do not share a common norms and sense of purpose, but rather on different motivations and values pursued by different institutions and individuals. As in the following, we will look into more details of the motivations for Korean ODA revealed in practice.

At the onset, it is necessary to understand why Korea wanted to be a member of the OECD/DAC to understand the underlying idea of ODA policy in Korea. Sixty years ago, Korea was one of the poorest countries in the world; it was a poverty-stricken and war-torn society. After rapid industrialisation and subsequent economic growth since the 1960s and 1970s,

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> www. aw.go.kr, Basic Law of International Development and Cooperation on 29 October 2019.

Korean society became affluent (Song 1990). In the 1980s, Korea went through a democratisation process and was able to consolidate democracy in the 1990s. In terms of social equality, Korea is one of the few countries which has been able to maintain social equality during rapid economic growth (S. Kwon 1998). It was a remarkable achievement in terms of economic development with social equity and political freedom. With such achievement in the background, the newly elected civilian government set an open economy in the globalising world as one of its main policy priorities. In 1996, Korea joined the OECD, an international organisation of industrialised countries. It could have been an important landmark for Korea to become one of the leading countries in the world, but it turned out to be a false dawn as the Korean economy descended into turmoil during the Asian economic crisis of 1997/98 and was on the brink of collapse (Weiss 1999).

During the Asian economic crisis, a great number of firms went into bankruptcy due to high interest rates, which were as high as 22 per cent at one point in 1998, and consequently the unemployment rate rose to the highest level of 6.8 per cent (H. J. Kwon 2001). However, the Korean economy was able to emerge from the crisis within a short period of time with an emergency support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (IMF 1997). One of the reasons why Korea was successful in its economic reform was that the reforms were carried out on the broad basis of social compromise. In return for economic reform, the Korean government strengthened existing social policy programmes (H. J. Kwon 2005).

Once the economic crisis was overcome through these reforms, the Korean government once again attempted to regain international recognition of its achievement. Joining the OECD/DAC, which was not completed when Korea became a member of the OECD in 1996, emerged as an important priority of foreign policy in this context.<sup>4</sup> In November 2005, the Korean government formulated a comprehensive ODA improvement plan, which represented the first government policy document regarding ODA (CIDC 2017). The plan outlined major issues and challenges related to ODA policy in Korea and proposed policy solutions to tackle them, including the creation of a coordinating committee with the government. In particular, it was considered a very important task to coordinate ODA policies of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Strategy and Finance, which were responsible for grants and concessional loans, respectively. According to the plan, the Committee for International Development Cooperation (CIDC) was established in 2006 as an inter-ministerial committee chaired by the Prime Minister (CIDC 2017).

In addition to enhancing policy coordination between the ministries responsible for ODA, the Korean government proceeded with other policy tasks for Korean admission to the OECD/DAC (EDCF 2017). In 2008 the Korean ODA system was peer-reviewed by the OECD/DAC, which put Korea's accession to the OECD/DAC on track. After the peer review, the OECD/DAC recommended five points to improve the ODA system in Korea (OECD 2008):

- 1. establishing a legal frame work and mid-term strategy for ODA policy;
- 2. increasing ODA volumes and coordinating aid channels and allocations:
- 3. strengthening ODA capacity in expertise and evaluation;
- 4. increasing the effectiveness of aid; and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Interview with former Ambassador Oh Joon, who was responsible for OECD affairs in the 2000s. The interview was conducted on 20 September 2019.

5. strengthening humanitarian efforts and cooperation with multilateral institutions.

In 2010, Korea was admitted to the OECD/DAC, and it was a very proud and historic moment for the Korean people as it symbolised the global recognition of Korea's development achievement for the last fifty years. A document published in 2010, entitled the Policy for Advancing International Development, which aimed to provide the basic rationale of ODA policy, reflected the government's confidence that OECD/DAC membership would instil great national pride in the Korean public (Government of Korea 2010). Although poverty reduction and self-reliance in developing countries were also included as foundational values of ODA policy, the government was determined to maintain this feeling of national pride as a main goal of ODA policy (CIDC 2017: 11). It was clearly expressed in the speech by then President Lee at the Singapore Summit in 2010. The President Lee's feeling was shared by most Koreans and it showed that ODA policy was strongly underlined by self-regarding rationale.

'…a young boy who once stood in the line to receive used clothes from foreign missionaries now stands before you as the President of the Republic of Korea…[Our] remarkable achievement goes out to all those who fought for us and for those who helped us when we were in desperate need…The Korean people who have been through wars and destitution are now prepared to contribute to global peace and prosperity…We are ready to do our part' (recited from S. Kim 2011: 812).

Another underlying idea of Korean ODA was to share Korean development experiences with developing countries (Stallings 2017). It is true that the Korean experience of transitioning from a very poor to an affluent society remains vivid and relevant for many developing countries in designing their public policies. Such an experience is captured by the notion of the developmental state (Woo-Cumings 1999). The developmental state refers to a policy regime in which economic development is considered the most important policy goal, and a strong state spearheaded by a centralised bureaucracy plays a key role in the policy process. In Ethiopia and Rwanda, for instance, the government benchmarked the policy regime of the developmental state for their framework of public policy. In Tanzania, the community development movements adopted under the developmental state in Korea in the 1970s, the so-called Saemaul Undong, were experimentally adapted for rural community development projects. To transfer Korean policy experiences in a systematic way, the Korean government has also implemented the Knowledge Sharing Programme (KSP) to pass on specific knowledge and skills developed in various public policy sectors to other developing countries. Transferring knowledge acquired in the development process is also a kind of self-regarding idea in that it highlights what Korea can offer to other developing countries. There is also danger of one-size-fits-all mistakes in which Korean experiences are adoptable to other countries without careful consideration of local contexts.

There are also other characteristics specific to Korean ODA in terms of the involvement of private actors. Compared to other donor countries, Korean ODA includes a large portion of concessionary loans in relation to grants. Compared to 5.7% of the OECD/DAC countries on average, concessionary loans account for 38.3 % of Korean ODA, while the grant portion accounts for the rest. Those concessionary loan are usually used for large-scale economic

infrastructure such as airports, roads, and water supply facilities. Korean firms are often involved in these large infrastructure projects, a practice which is often criticised as advancing a donor country's own economic interests. Further empirical analysis shows that Korea provided more aid to higher middle income developing countries (E. M. Kim and Oh 2012). The authors of the research argued that it indicated the tendency of economic consideration in the practice of ODA in Korea.

It is also true that Korean people have a strong ethical obligation because they were given international relief and humanitarian aid in the 1950 and 1960s. It is worth remembering that after World War II, Korea received a large amount of international relief and development assistance. In particular, Korea received international aid during the Korean War (1950–1952), mainly from the USA and UN agencies such as the United Nations Korea Reconstructive Agency (UNKRA; Cha et al. 1997). The aid through UNKRA was about USD 120 million during the reconstruction period of 1953–1960, while aid from the USA reached USD 1,745 million, including Public Law 480 funds for food assistance (Cha et al. 1997: 23).

International support continued to come to Korea through the 1960s. It should be a strong obligation for those who have received aid from others in times of difficulties to return such support to other people in need. For Korea, it should be a strong ethical duty to provide international support for people in humanitarian crisis and poverty. Ordinary citizens and civil society groups, indeed, volunteer to carry out humanitarian work. According to the National Survey on ODA in 2017, the first reason for Koreans supporting the provision of foreign aid is that Korea has also benefited from foreign aid in the past (Park and Kim 2017). This rationale has been always listed as the first reason for supporting ODA, with higher priority than other rationales such as the universal purpose of international development for poverty reduction and global peace or the national economic and diplomatic interests of the nation. It is an important imperative to realize ordinary citizens' ethical obligation through government ODA policy, as this paper attempts.

If we reflect on the experience of Korean ODA over the past two decades, there is an important underlying rationale we could elicit: Korean ODA practice is deeply self-regarding. It can be summarised in the following ways. First, it is a significant symbol of national pride that Korea has become a donor country as a member of the OEDC/DAC (CIDC 2017), Second, Korea has relevant experience and knowledge from which developing countries may learn for their advantage. Such knowledge and skills range from the developmental state at the macrolevel to vocational training at the field level. Third, Korean ODA can also benefit Korean firms attempting to establish a business presence in developing countries. Such a self-regarding rationale may not necessarily be bad in and of itself as an idea behind ODA. It explains the inner motivation for ODA. Nevertheless, there is one critical element missing in this policy rationale people in developing countries and the social and institutional challenges which Korean ODA is intended to support. Normative rationale has not been seriously taken in ODA policy and as a result, the policy goals and objectives were set on a very abstract level and targeted to only domestic actors. Further, the self-regarding rationale should be combined with the idea of moral duty and obligation in relation to ODA. The basic perspective of ODA policy needs to change, taking into account the global community. Fortunately, the Korean people have a moral obligation to help people in other countries because they have received support from the international community as a developing country. It is now necessary to reinforce the

vie w that the Korean state should play its role as a moral agent that fulfils this moral obligation of its citizens. In other words, it should be made clear that the Korean state must provide help to other countries through ODA in the international community. In particular, it is important to construct the idea that there is a duty and obligation for Korea to undertake ODA beyond a self-regarding rationale.

### Korean ODA should adopt a three-pronged approach to development

This paper has raised the question of why Korea should support developing countries for their development. Entering the second decade as an OECD/DAC member, Korea needs a clear sense of purpose and a normative rationale for its ODA policy in order to contemplate future policy directions. The paper has first discussed the normative theories that construct a moral duty and ethical obligation for international development assistance in order to set a normative reference. In particular, this paper revealed that moral theories based on individual person as moral agents cannot provide a sufficient imperative for ODA. Instead, it is necessary to regard the state as an ethical agent to provide support to developing countries for social and economic development. The paper also argues that the state as a member of the global institutional order and an ethical agent responsible for and accountable to citizens needs to contribute to the creation of the global public good. Secondly, this paper has reviewed the underlying policy rationale of Korean ODA. Behind the abstract ideas of human well-being and global prosperity that the Korean government officially states as goals of ODA, Korean ODA policy is strongly underlined by self-regarding rationale of national pride and respect as well as economic considerations. Although Korean people have a very strong feeling of an ethical obligation since they received a large amount of international support in times of difficulties, Korean ODA policy needs to be firmly based on normative grounds as well as inner motivations of self-regards.

With such a normative discussion, this paper suggests a three-pronged approach to Korean ODA for the future, while incorporating the strength of Korean development experience and knowledge: aid for human freedom, aid for socio-economic and political development, and aid for the global public good. First, considering that human freedom is an intrinsic goal of development and that it is individual persons who actually suffer from poverty, disease, and violation, Korean ODA should aim to protect human freedom as universal value, manifested in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The ODA policy of Korea should focus on eliminating the barriers to individual freedom in developing countries and establish this as the fundamental goal. For example, the central goal of ODA policy should be setting up goals of reducing extreme poverty that still exists in many least-developed countries, liberating individuals from violence and conflicts in fragile countries, and applying a rights-based approach that promotes individual rights across a range of issues.

Secondly, Korean ODA needs to support developing countries to build effective institutions, which will give options and arenas to exercise freedom. It is an area where Korea has strength. What is really important in implementing international development cooperation is establishing a self-reliant and sustainable basis for socio-economic development in the future. Building effective public institutions is constructing enabling environment. Further, Korean ODA should

place a stronger emphasis on development effectiveness rather than aid effectiveness. Successful aid projects often do not contribute to the overall development of the country, which was described as a micro-macro paradox by Mosley (Mosley 1986). Kore an government has succeeded in strengthening the evaluation of development projects over the past decade, while emphasizing aid effectiveness. However, there has been a lack of concern about development effectiveness that ultimately contributes to the overall development of partner countries. Korea's aid accounts for less than 2% in total received aid to partner countries (KIEP 2019), but the budget allocated to each project is too small and partitioned into many government organizations who want to engage in ODA. In this way, it cannot contribute to the socio-economic development of the partner country. In order to achieve development effectiveness, it is necessary to introduce a program-based approach by increasing the overall size of the budget and extending the program implementation period. Moreover, aid should play a role as leverage and catalyst that can lead to greater development effectiveness by engaging the private sector. Further, in order to link the successes of microlevel projects to social development at the macrolevel, it is necessary for public institutions to work effectively. This is what we can learn from the Korean development experience, which is still relevant today.

Lastly, Korean ODA should also address challenges at the global scale, such as climate change and air and sea pollution, so that the global public good is maintained. The global migration crisis and threats to global peace are also important challenges that require a strong response from Korean ODA. Although the benefits will be evenly distributed when this global public good is provided, the Korean people will also benefit, as will many other citizens in the world. Considering that Korea is one of the world's largest trading nations, Korea has a great responsibility for the provision of the global public good. To contribute to global public goods, Korea must pay attention to and actively engage in global issues. The most important global problems that will face us within the next decade or so might be such as climate change, migration, terrorism and conflict. However, the aid ratio specifically focused on climate change in the Korean ODA was only 3% in 2014 while the DAC country average was 24% (OECD 2016: 225). In addition, support for conflict and peace activities accounted for 0.3%, and support for indoor refugees was zero percent among total Korean ODA in 2017. It is now time to move forward beyond sharing Korea's own self-regarding development experience. Korean ODA needs to seriously address how to contribute to the development needs of the partner countries and the global issues of the international community.5

Even though the discussion in this paper is limited to the case of Korea, there are a certain number of implications for East Asian donors. Of course Japan, Korea, and China show very clear differences in the experience of ODA. Japan has been one of the largest donor countries among members for some time, although its share in the total volume of the world's official development assistance (ODA) has been in decline. It is also important to note that China has its ambitious Belts and Roads Initiative.

Despite such differences, a significant body of literature argues that East Asian nations have exhibited certain characteristics in their international development efforts (Kato et al. 2016; Lancaster 2007; Wood 2008), in particular economic consideration, in their ODA. It is necessary to investigate why East Asian nations have proceeded in such a way and to discuss how East

www.stat.oecd.org, accessed on 5, November 2019.

Asian ODA can be carried out in a way consistent with the idea of universal moral duty and ethical obligation. Such a discussion will also be useful for developing countries in East Asia and beyond. In recent years, the so-called emerging donors have surged rapidly. Eastern European countries have joined the OECD/DAC, and Arab countries such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar are also providing significant assistance to MENA regions. In addition, middle income countries in Southeast Asia, such as Thailand and Malaysia, are establishing aid agencies. A distinctive feature of these emerging donors is that they have higher expectations for domestic economic and diplomatic interests than traditional donor countries (IPSOS 2015). In this global context, fulfilling moral duty and ethical obligation, and creating global public goods needs to be reemphasized as the principles of international development cooperation.

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