Revisiting Neoclassical Realism in Understanding Variations in States’ Armaments: A Case of South Korea and Taiwan’s Ballistic Missile Defense

Bee Yun Jo

Abstract

Debating on Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik’s critique on neoclassical realism, this article seeks to argue that the theory retains its own merits in understanding state behaviors in the international system. Paying particular attention to neoclassical realist literatures – including Randall L. Schweller’s elite cohesion/fragmentation, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro’s resource extractive state, and Steven E. Lobell’s discussions on foreign policy executives and societal elites – the article seeks to illustrate how the theory accounts for variations in states’ response to external security imperatives. Drawing parallels between neoclassical realism and literatures on preference formation and rationality in social science, this study argues that the foundational merit of neoclassical realism lies in advancing the realist paradigm towards what this study calls a model of “situated rationality” for capability aggregation. For empirical clarification, the last section of the article shows how the neoclassical realist framework can account for variations in South Korea and Taiwan’s armaments in the ballistic missile defense (BMD), despite similar security imperatives.

Keywords Neoclassical realism․capability aggregation․structural realism․situated rationality․ballistic missile defense (BMD)